Chapter 2 - Form of Government - Governing Principles
Rationale of Article 7 – Form of Government
Iran is not an ordinary newly established country; Iran is a historical land whose national identity has, over the course of thousands of years, repeatedly passed through states and dynasties and yet endured. In such a country, the “symbolic institution of continuity” is not merely a political ornament; it is part of the historical memory and a psychological pillar of national unity. From Cyrus through various monarchical periods, in the historical mind of Iranians, monarchy has often been understood as a sign of state building, unity, and the continuity of Iran; even when governments changed, the conception of “a unified Iran” endured through a symbolic محور. Yet this same history also conveys a clear message: whenever political power was transformed into one person or one institution not subject to accountability, the country suffered, not only in terms of liberty, but also in terms of stability and future viability. Therefore, Article 7 seeks to preserve “historical continuity” without reproducing “unchecked power.” This is precisely the meaning of constitutional monarchy: preserving the symbol and continuity, while limiting power. Article 7 also draws upon a human reality: in order for societies not to collapse in times of crisis, they require a unifying symbol that stands above factions and short lived governments. In Iran, that symbol can be a limited and nonpolitical monarchy; something under which governments come and go, yet the country does not fall into “identity chaos” in terms of the symbol of national unity. This function is the same as that which many countries seek through symbolic institutions, whether monarchy or ceremonial presidency, but in Iran, because of the historical weight of monarchy, it is more natural and more readily understood.
At the same time, Article 7 expressly states that this monarchy must be “democratic”; that is, the administration of the country must be removed from the symbol and placed in the hands of the institutions elected by the people. This part of Article 7 is a direct response to our bitter historical experiences: if historical or charismatic legitimacy replaces the vote of the people, it will sooner or later lead to the exclusion of rivals and the closure of the path of reform. Thus, the democratic character in Article 7 means that power must be transferable; neither sacred, nor lifelong, nor beyond oversight. Article 7 also places secularism alongside monarchy because Iran is a land of diverse beliefs and varied identities. Whenever government became tied to an official religion and a religious interpretation, the result was the division of the people into insiders and outsiders and the transformation of politics into a war of belief. Secularism in this Article means that the state shall not become the instrument of any religious reading; not in order to suppress religion, but in order to preserve freedom of religion and to prevent faith from being turned into an instrument of power. Finally, decentralization is the response to a geographical and historical truth: Iran is vast and contains different cultures and regions. A severe concentration of power produces both corruption and inefficiency, and also a sense of injustice and exclusion. Decentralization in Article 7 means that the country remains “unified,” but the administration of affairs is brought closer to the people so that both national unity is strengthened and the motives for rupture and conflict are reduced.
Summary: Article 7 seeks to unite the best of two worlds: on the one hand, historical continuity and a national symbol consistent with Iran’s tradition of state building, and on the other hand, modern anti despotism locks that do not permit any person or institution, even with the support of history and glory, to become the owner of the country. This Article declares that Iran can both take pride in the history of monarchy and forever close the path to the return of despotism.
Rationale of Article 8 – Supremacy of the Constitution
Article 8 is the anti despotism pillar in the architecture of government, because despotism usually begins precisely here: at the point where a power defines itself as standing above the law, or creates a special law for itself. If the Constitution is not truly the highest legal document, the remaining principles become nothing more than beautiful sentences that can be bypassed by a single order, directive, or political interpretation. The historical experience of Iran has shown that the problem is not merely that one person may be bad; the principal problem is that when the legal order is unable to restrain power, whoever reaches power, even with good intentions, is gradually tempted to bend the law in his own favor. Under such conditions, the country enters a cycle we have seen many times before: the law is strict for the people, but flexible for those who hold power; it is an obligation for the citizen, but an instrument for the ruler. Article 8 is written precisely to break this cycle. This Article declares that nothing, neither popularity, nor history, nor revolution, nor security, nor crisis, has the right to take the place of the Constitution. For once crisis becomes a justification for lawlessness, crises never end; they become a permanent pretext for the extension of power and the elimination of liberty.
The deeper logic of Article 8 is that the Constitution must be the playing field, not the toy of the winner of the game. This means that the rules must be more stable than the players. Governments, parliaments, prime ministers, and even majorities come and go, but the legal framework must remain so that the transfer of power may be possible. If the framework changes with every political shift, political competition turns into war, because every side understands that if it loses, it may lose everything. Therefore, Article 8 is necessary even for political stability and tranquility, not only for liberty. In practical terms, Article 8 conveys a clear message: all ordinary laws, regulations, decrees, and governmental decisions are valid only when they are consistent with the Constitution. This means that power is compelled to conform itself to law, rather than bending law to conform itself to power. This is precisely the distinction between the rule of law and the rule of persons.
Summary: Article 8 declares that Iran is not meant to return once again to a condition in which an individual or an institution, under any title, stands above the law. This Article is the most fundamental guarantee that the Constitution may endure for thousands of years, because the endurance of a constitution does not depend upon the goodness of generations, but upon the fact that even the worst holders of power are unable to circumvent it.
Rationale of Article 9 – Rule of Law
Article 9 declares that “the law governs all, not individuals.” From the standpoint of opposition to despotism, this Article is even more important than many political mechanisms, because despotism usually begins with this claim: “this person or this institution is an exception.” Once an exception is created, the law ceases to be an instrument of justice and becomes an instrument of obedience; it remains binding for the people, but becomes something that those in power may circumvent. The historical experience of Iran has shown that the problem was not merely the absence of law; the principal problem was the dualization of law: one formal law for society, and one unwritten law for those who possess influence. It is precisely this duality that makes corruption seem natural, destroys meritocracy, and causes people to despair of political participation. Article 9 is written precisely to cut off this “two tier law.”
The rule of law means that power is legitimate only when it acts within the framework of law and can be called to account. If power is not subject to accountability, sooner or later it becomes the owner of the country, even if it came through the vote of the people. Here lies the deeper message of Article 9: popularity, votes, historical standing, or past service, none of these is a license to go beyond the law. For if the law can be broken, then tomorrow anyone else will break it under the same pretext. From a logical point of view, Article 9 is the restraint upon all other restraints. Why? Because separation of powers, elections, and even citizens’ rights cannot be enforced without the rule of law. If an officeholder is to remain immune, that person can render the courts ineffective, bypass parliament, silence the media, and turn elections into a spectacle. Thus, Article 9 means that nowhere in the system does there exist an “untouchable” point. In Iran’s political culture, one of the enduring dangers has been that power escapes control through concepts such as expediency, security, special circumstances, or historical necessity. Article 9 is intended to declare that even in difficult circumstances, the correct response is “greater adherence to law,” not becoming “extra legal.” For going beyond the law may move matters forward in the short term, but in the long term it draws the country into a cycle of force, corruption, and mistrust.
Summary: Article 9 means that Iran is a country in which no one, not even the highest officeholder, has the right to bend the law to his own advantage. This Article is the pillar of public trust; and without public trust, neither stability remains, nor development, nor even lasting security.
Rationale of Article 10 – Separation of Powers
Article 10 declares that power must be divided into three separate pillars: legislation, execution, and adjudication. Its logic is contained in one sentence: concentrated power, sooner or later, is abused, not necessarily because people are evil, but because an unrestrained structure tempts even a good person and allows a bad person to act without cost. In the history of Iran, one of the principal roots of despotism has been that “one center” made the law, enforced it, and controlled adjudication as well. The result was that if the government made a decision, that same government wrote the law for it, that same government tried the dissenter, and that same government carried out the judgment. This meant that complaint against power became practically meaningless, because the judge was power itself. Separation of powers is designed precisely so that power shall not be its own judge. But the deeper point is that separation of powers is not merely “division”; its aim is to create balance. If the powers are separate, but one can swallow the others, despotism returns. Therefore, Article 10 is the foundation of an anti despotism design that is completed in the following Articles:
- the legislature must not be able to turn the judge into its instrument
- the executive must not be able to suspend parliament or render it ineffective
- the judiciary must not be able to become a policy maker or escape accountability
Separation of powers also has a vital advantage for stability: when political disagreement arises, instead of turning into street conflict or coup d’état, the disagreement is discharged through “legal channels.” In other words, conflict is transferred from force to law: parliament debates, the government executes, and the court adjudicates. This is what removes the country, in the long run, from the cycle of revolution–repression–revolution. In a constitutional monarchy as well, separation of powers acquires a more precise meaning: because the monarch may be the symbol of unity, but the executive power must remain entirely in the hands of the elected government so that no path remains for the “executive exercise of monarchy” or for a “shadow government.” Thus, in this model, separation of powers is both against executive despotism and against the return of non elected power.
Summary: Article 10 seeks to turn one simple truth into constitutional law: no one should both write the law, execute it, and rule upon disputes arising from it. This Article is the foundation of the balance of powers; and without it, even the best slogans and rights are crushed beneath power at the first crisis.
Rationale of Article 11 – Balance of Powers
Separation of powers, as set forth in Article 10, is not sufficient, because the powers may be separate and yet one of them may become so large and so powerful that it effectively renders the others meaningless. Article 11 is written for this very reason: to prevent the powers from being “swallowed” by one branch. In other words, power is not merely divided; it must be designed in such a way that no part can suffocate the others. In the historical experience of Iran, one of the common paths to despotism has been that one center of power, usually the executive branch and the security apparatus, has gradually cast its shadow over legislation and adjudication as well:
- parliament has either been stripped of real authority or reduced to ceremony
- the courts have either become dependent or, out of fear and pressure, have failed to act independently
- and the result has been that even if the names of institutions remained, the spirit of balance disappeared
Article 11 declares that: no branch has the right to take possession of the instruments of the other branches. The government may not control parliament by force, money, or political pressure; parliament may not turn the courts into its own political chamber; and the courts may not take the place of the legislature and engage in policy making. This Article prevents “cooperation” from turning into “domination.” The deeper point is that the balance of powers exists not only to restrain despotism, but also to preserve liberty and stability. When everything is concentrated in the hands of one branch, decisions become faster, but mistakes also become larger and irreparable, because no effective brake exists. Balance of powers means that the country has brakes, meaning that a dangerous decision passes through several different filters before becoming a disaster. This controlled slowness is the price of liberty and endurance.
Article 11 also conveys an important message to society: “no savior has the right to gather all instruments into one hand.” Even if the people are pleased with a government, a parliament, or a political wave, the Constitution does not permit that wave to seize the entire system. This is precisely what makes a constitution usable “for thousands of years”: it does not rely upon a good person; it relies upon a mechanism that can restrain a bad one as well. And the final sentence of the Article, stating that “all branches are subject to legal oversight,” means that oversight must not be arbitrary or political; it must be carried out through law, the courts, and transparent mechanisms. Political competition is permissible, but the transformation of competition into elimination and revenge is prohibited.
Summary: Article 11 is the final anti despotism lock at the level of the architecture of power. If Article 10 says to separate power, Article 11 says do not allow anyone to gather it together again.
Rationale of Article 12 – Responsibility and Accountability
Article 12 is written to close the most important gateway through which despotism enters: power without accountability. Wherever in the history of Iran, and of the world, an officeholder or an institution has in practice been immune from questioning, scrutiny, and removal, corruption, abuse, and repression have grown in that very place. For when no cost exists for error and abuse, error and abuse become the “normal conduct of power.”
The deeper logic of Article 12 is that power, by its very nature, tends to expand. Not because human beings are inherently evil, but because instruments and authority create temptation: today an exception, tomorrow a proviso, the day after tomorrow a “necessity,” and in the end a permanent structure. Accountability means that this chain must be cut at its very first link. It means that no officeholder or institution may say: “I do not answer because my office is high, because my work concerns security, because the circumstances are exceptional, because I am popular, because I am historical.” In the political experience of Iran, one of the chronic pains has been precisely this: that “real power” has always stood somewhere more concealed than “formal responsibility”; that is, some made decisions but were not answerable, while others answered but were not the decision makers. The result has been both public mistrust and inefficiency: the people ask, “Then who is responsible?” and the government cannot provide a clear answer. Article 12, by defining: whoever holds authority or public funds, places the sphere of accountability precisely upon the real source of power.
This Article also guarantees that government shall not become the “owner of public funds.” Wherever the people’s money is spent, an account must be rendered; because the public budget is the very place from which corruption feeds and through which networks of power are built. If there is no oversight and no scrutiny, government is transformed, instead of a service, into a machine for the distribution of patronage, and in the end liberty too becomes a victim. With respect to the monarch as well, Article 12 contains a vital point: although the monarch is intended to be symbolic and nonpolitical, there must not remain within the structure any point immune from law. The history of Iran has shown that even symbols, if not restrained, can gradually become political power, or at least become a pretext for networks of influence. Therefore, Article 12 declares that the monarch too is bound by the Constitution; that means neither sanctity, nor exception, nor a safe margin beyond the reach of law.
Summary: Article 12 is the heart of anti despotism, because despotism begins at the point where “power” is separated from “responsibility.” This Article seeks to keep the two forever bound together: whoever holds authority must answer; and if that person does not answer or commits a violation, there must exist a legal path for restraint and removal. This is precisely what makes a constitution reliable for future generations as well, even if politicians are not good.
Rationale of Article 13 – Government Transparency
Government transparency means that the government must understand that it is not “the owner of the country,” but rather “the trustee of the country.” When money, power, and decision making come from the people, the people have the right to know what decision has been made, where the money has gone, and what contract has been concluded. Article 13 removes this right from the realm of moral recommendation and turns it into a rule of governance: the principle is publicity. The historical experience of Iran has shown that despotism is not formed by force alone; it is also built through “secrecy.” Whenever the government or the institutions of power have been able to make decisions behind closed doors, three things have grown at the same time: corruption, patronage, and repression. For in darkness, the cost of wrongdoing falls. Transparency means raising the cost of corruption and increasing the likelihood that violations will be discovered before they become a permanent structure.
The deeper logic of Article 13 is that real oversight is impossible without information. We may build even the best institutions, parliament, supreme court, audit office, but if data, documents, and contracts remain concealed, these institutions either become powerless or turn into a spectacle. Transparency, therefore, is the “fuel of the balance of powers”: parliament needs information in order to control the government; the court needs documents in order to adjudicate; the media needs data in order to expose wrongdoing; and the people need knowledge in order to choose rightly. In the political history and culture of Iran, one of the great harms has been that governments have regarded themselves as “keepers of the people’s secrets,” rather than “answerable to the people.” This outlook causes even ordinary decisions to become confidential, and society, instead of relying on trust, comes to rely on rumor and suspicion. The result is a dangerous polarization: either the people cease to believe and become distrustful, or the government increases pressure in order to maintain control. Transparency breaks this cycle and builds trust through rational means, not through propaganda. Yet Article 13 also recognizes one reality: every country has information that is genuinely sensitive. The difference between a healthy government and a despotic government lies precisely here: a healthy government defines the “exception” narrowly and precisely, whereas a despotic government turns the “exception” into an endless sea. Therefore, Article 13 declares that even where an exception is necessary, it must be precise, limited, and governed by law; in other words, security must not become a permanent umbrella for secrecy. For one of the greatest abuses in our contemporary history has been exactly this: “security” becoming a pretext for silencing voices, closing files, and concealing corruption.
Summary: Article 13 is a simple yet foundational principle: a country that seeks to remain durable for thousands of years must learn to keep power in the light. Transparency is not the enemy of security; it is the enemy of corruption and despotism, and lasting security cannot be built without it.
Rationale of Article 14 – Prohibition of the Concentration of Power
Article 14 is the “law of laws” in the struggle against despotism: the principal problem of Iran throughout history has not been the lack of good people or good programs; the problem has been that power has been gathered into one point. Once power is concentrated, even if it begins with the intention of service, it gradually comes to see itself as “entitled” and as “owner,” and in order to preserve itself, it restricts liberty and competition. Thus, Article 14, instead of making morality the condition of individuals, makes structure the condition: no one has the right to hold several principal keys of power in his pocket at the same time. Separation of powers, as set forth in Article 10, declares that the branches must be separate; Article 14 goes one step further and declares that even in practice, no person or institution may be able to circumvent that separation. For in reality, despotism is often formed through “legal maneuvers,” not by formal declaration. For example, legislation may appear independent, while the government, through budgetary tools, security instruments, or appointments, holds it in its grasp. Or the judiciary may appear independent, while executive or political influence turns it into an instrument for the elimination of rivals. Article 14 seeks to close these informal paths as well.
The historical experience of Iran has shown that when one center of power both writes the law, executes it, and controls adjudication, three certain results follow:
- immunity: power escapes accountability.
- corruption: because real oversight disappears.
- repression: because political competition is turned into an existential threat.
Article 14 is written precisely to prevent this triad. If the executive branch cannot control the judiciary, repression does not become cost free. If the executive branch cannot seize the legislative power, laws are not written for the benefit of one group. If the judiciary cannot enter into policy making, justice is not sacrificed to politics. Thus, each branch remains strong in its own place and yet does not cross beyond its own boundary. The deeper logic of Article 14 is that countries do not collapse because of “great power,” but because of “unrestrained power.” In the short term, the concentration of power may make action faster, but in the long term it makes errors greater and beyond correction. When everything lies in the hands of one center, if it errs, the whole country errs. When power is dispersed, errors become more localized and reform becomes more possible. In a constitutional monarchy as well, this Article has a special role: because it prevents every kind of “soft return” to executive monarchy or to a “shadow government.” Even if the monarch is symbolic, if one point outside oversight can gather several instruments of power, that point becomes the real center of government. Article 14 declares that such a point must not exist.
Summary: Article 14 seeks to turn one historical truth into a permanent rule: despotism is born from the concentration of power. If this Constitution is to endure for thousands of years, it must create a structure in which, even if generations change and persons change, no one can gather power once again into a single place.
Rationale of Article 15 – Principle of Political Competition
Article 15 is written so that politics in Iran may be removed from the condition of a “war for survival” and transformed into a “competition for better governance.” When the transfer of power is not lawful and peaceful, every political contest becomes a battle of life and death: the winner takes everything, and the loser fears elimination. In such an atmosphere, the parties pursue the removal of the rival rather than program and service, and society enters a dangerous cycle of fear, repression, revolt, and the collapse of trust. The historical experience of Iran has shown that one of the roots of instability and extremism has been that the change of power was either very difficult or impossible; and when the lawful path is closed, society is inevitably drawn toward unlawful paths. Article 15 is precisely the lock upon this problem: it declares that the path of change must always remain open, so that the political energy of the country may be discharged through law rather than through explosion.
“Free competition” in this Article means that the people have the right to choose among real options, not among options predetermined in advance. Freedom of competition means that no group has the right to clear the field for itself by force, money, state propaganda, or security instruments. If the field of competition is not real, elections become a spectacle, and spectacle, sooner or later, ends in despotism. “Periodic elections” means that no power has the right to postpone elections or render them ineffective by permanent pretexts such as crisis, security, expediency, or special circumstances. In our history, one of the common instruments of the concentration of power has been precisely this: they made the “exception” permanent. Article 15 declares that the change of power must occur at specified and predictable times, so that no one may hold the country hostage to a state of emergency. And the most important part of the Article is this: the transferability of power. This means that legitimacy is completed by the act of “handing over.” If someone is elected but does not leave, or if someone is defeated but does not surrender power, the political order enters, from that very moment, the path of despotism. The peaceful transfer of power means that government accepts that it is not the owner of the country; it is only a temporary administrator.
Summary: Article 15 is the heart of the endurance of a free order. So long as power can pass peacefully and lawfully from hand to hand, no one is compelled to resort to violence or revolution in order to bring about change. This Article guarantees that Iran will be able to “manage” political disagreements, rather than turning every disagreement into a crisis concerning the destiny of the country. This is what makes the Constitution durable for future generations.