We have chosen for Iran a constitutional monarchy with a prime ministerial government, because we consider this structure to be more balanced, more anti authoritarian, less costly, and better suited to the rational administration of the country than many of the common models, especially the presidential republic based on the direct election of the president.

Our aim has not been to choose a system that is merely traditional or merely symbolic. Our aim has been to build an order in which national unity, political stability, executive efficiency, and restraint of power are preserved at the same time. For this reason, on the one hand we have chosen constitutional monarchy for the symbolic and supra political position of the country, and on the other hand we have chosen a parliamentary prime ministership for the real and daily administration of government.

Why constitutional monarchy?
Because the country needs a symbolic, neutral, and nonpartisan head who is the embodiment of historical continuity, national unity, and the stability of the country, while at the same time holding no executive, legislative, or judicial power. In this model, the King is neither an absolute ruler nor a participant in political competition. Rather, he holds a limited, ceremonial position bound by the Constitution. This creates an important advantage: the country can have a stable national symbol without concentrating real power in the hands of an unaccountable officeholder.

In many systems, when the head of state and the head of government are united in one person, the danger of the personalization of power becomes high. But in a constitutional monarchy, these two are separated:

• King = the symbol of the unity and continuity of the country
• Prime Minister = the head of government and the person responsible for the administration of the country

This separation is one of the important instruments for the restraint of power and for preventing the excessive concentration of authority in a single individual.

Why a prime ministership, and not a directly elected presidency?
Because in a presidential system, one person must campaign across the entire country, build a public image, and launch a vast, expensive nationwide contest in order to reach the head of the executive branch. This kind of competition appears popular on the surface, but in practice it often drives politics toward mass advertising, populist slogans, and dependence on heavy financial resources. The broader and more national the field of competition becomes, the greater the need for money, media, networks of influence, and political capital. And wherever the cost of competition rises, the danger of corrupt money, hidden interests, and unhealthy bargains rises as well.

We do not regard this path as suitable for Iran. A country that seeks to break out of the cycle of corruption, populism, and concentration of power should not choose its head of government through the most expensive and most noisy national competition.

By contrast, in a parliamentary prime ministerial system, the people vote for the representatives of their own electoral districts. This is a fundamental and decisive difference. A representative competes in a more limited constituency. Therefore:

• the cost of his campaign is far lower
• his dependence on large capital and corrupt networks is reduced
• the people of his district know him better
• judgment about him is based more on local knowledge, record, performance, and real ability, rather than on media image making on a national scale

In such a structure, political choice is formed from the bottom upward, not from the top downward. The people send to Parliament those whom they know better in their own constituencies, and then from within that Parliament the Prime Minister arises. This means that the head of government is not the product of a costly nationwide spectacle, but the result of a more genuine, more specialized, and less corrupt process of representation.

Why is this method more specialized?
Because in this model, the Prime Minister is usually someone who, before reaching the head of government:

• has worked in the real sphere of politics and legislation
• has been able to gain the confidence of representatives
• has shown the ability to build coalitions and to govern politically
• and has undergone institutional evaluation

In a presidential system, someone may reach the summit of power merely through skill in advertising, charisma, or the creation of a public wave. But in a prime ministerial system, reaching the office of Prime Minister usually requires real political weight, managerial ability, knowledge of government, and confidence within the structure. For this reason, we consider this model more specialized and more rational.

Why is a Prime Minister better suited to governing the country?
Because we need a government that is both strong and accountable. In this system, the Prime Minister:

• is the head of government
• directs the executive branch
• appoints and dismisses ministers
• administers executive policies
• and issues the orders necessary for the execution of the law

This means that the Prime Minister is not a weak or ceremonial officeholder, but the real and effective head of the executive branch. This is necessary for a country that needs an efficient government, clear decision making, and effective execution.

But the important difference is this: this power is not unrestrained. The Prime Minister emerges from within the House of Representatives and remains accountable before that same House. If he departs from the law, transparency, or public confidence, he can be restrained and removed through lawful means. Therefore, this system creates a combination of:

• executive authority for the effective administration of the country
• and parliamentary control for the prevention of authoritarianism

This is precisely the point at which, in our view, the prime ministerial system performs better than the presidential republic:
it grants executive power without turning it into a direct, personal, and unrestrainable power.

What is the role of the Senate in this structure?
Alongside the House of Representatives, the Senate also exists as the second chamber, so that not only population and numerical majority become decisive. The Senate represents the provinces and plays a role in legislation, important treaties, and the confirmation of officeholders. This means that alongside the direct will of the people, territorial balance and institutional stability also enter the structure of government. Thus, neither can the government become unrestrained, nor a temporary majority, nor can centralization swallow everything into itself.

So why have we chosen this system?
Because we seek an order in which:

• the King is the symbol of unity, not the center of executive power
• the Prime Minister is strong, yet remains accountable to the representatives of the people
• the representatives are elected at lower cost, with greater knowledge, and with less financial dependence
• and the head of government emerges from this same real and more specialized representation, not from a costly nationwide competition prone to corruption

This model, in our view, is more suitable for Iran, because it is:

• less person centered
• less dependent on propaganda
• less costly
• less dependent on corrupt money
• more specialized
• more capable of making government effective
• and at the same time, by properly dividing the roles among the King, the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Prime Minister, it reduces the possibility of the return of authoritarianism

Our ideal in this system is clear:
a constitutional monarchy for stability and unity,
a powerful Prime Minister for execution,
a House of Representatives for the direct will of the people,
a Senate for balance and stability,
and a legal structure in which power can act, but cannot become unrestrained.