Chapter 3 – Elections, Political Parties, Referendum
Rationale of Article 16 – Free Elections
Article 16 declares that if sovereignty is truly to belong to the people, the means by which it is exercised must also be real. Free elections are not merely a ceremony; they are the “principal mechanism for preventing despotism.” For when the people are able to choose and replace their rulers, no power can regard itself as the owner of the country. The experience of Iran has shown that the problem has not merely been the absence of elections; the problem has been that at times elections were held, but they were neither free nor competitive, or their results were not trustworthy. Such elections, instead of creating legitimacy, produce mistrust and drive society toward violence or passivity. Therefore, Article 16 seeks to draw a clear red line: an election that is not free bears only the “name of an election” and cannot become the foundation of legitimate power.
The five characteristics set forth in Article 16 are each an anti despotism lock:
- free means that neither the voter nor the candidate is subject to fear, threat, compulsion, or economic and security pressure. Otherwise, the vote becomes a signature extracted under coercion.
- competitive means that real options must exist and that the field must not be closed in advance to the benefit of one group. Real competition prevents the formation of permanent power.
- sound means that fraud, vote buying, manipulation of results, and the engineering of elections are crimes subject to review and adjudication. Soundness means that the people may be confident that their vote is counted as it is cast.
- periodic means that the timing of elections must be predictable and fixed, and that no power may postpone them under permanent pretexts. This prevents the transformation of a “state of emergency” into permanent rule.
- subject to public oversight means that the people, the media, political parties, and independent institutions must be able to observe and examine the electoral process. For if oversight is monopolized by the government itself, the election too will ultimately fall under the government’s monopoly.
From the standpoint of the balance of powers, free elections are the circulatory engine of the system: parliament acquires legitimacy, the government becomes answerable, oversight institutions gain popular backing, and the transfer of power becomes possible without crisis. Without free elections, even the best anti corruption and anti despotism laws remain on paper, because the path to reforming power from within is closed.
Summary: Article 16 guarantees that the change of power shall remain a permanent and enforceable right, not a slogan. This Article rescues the country from the cycle of “unchangeable government → social explosion” and lays the foundation for long term stability.
Rationale of Article 17 – The Right to Vote with the Condition of Citizenship
Article 17 is written so that it may be determined with precision who is the “holder of the vote” and who is the “holder of the country.” When we say that sovereignty belongs to the people of Iran, we must make clear that the exercise of that sovereignty, namely voting, is the right of those who are the legal members of the Iranian nation: the citizens of Iran. The condition of citizenship means that the vote is an instrument for determining the destiny of the country, and the determination of the country’s destiny is the right of those who have a legal and enduring bond with it; it is not a vague right capable of discretionary expansion. In the history of Iran, one of the enduring harms in politics has been that the concept of “the people” has at times become ambiguous, leaving the way open to interpretation. Ambiguity at such a point is dangerous, because in times of crisis it can become an instrument of dispute and abuse. Article 17, by stating expressly “only the citizens of Iran,” closes this ambiguity and clarifies from the outset the boundary of political rights.
Yet Article 17 concerns not only “who votes,” but also the “quality of the vote.” The three simultaneous locks contained in this Article ensure that the vote is real:
- the equality of the vote means that no citizen has a vote heavier or lighter than that of another. This lock prevents the creation of first class and second class citizens and prevents the country from becoming a system of privilege.
- the secrecy of the vote means that the voter must be free from fear and pressure. In a society in which political, administrative, economic, or security pressure may exist, the secret ballot is the most important shield of freedom of choice. A public or traceable vote very quickly turns voting into an instrument of control.
- the prohibition of coercion, reward, and punishment means that the vote must not be traded or imposed. The control of the vote is not exercised by force alone; it is also exercised by the promise of employment, privilege, or the threat of deprivation. This Article declares that the vote must be the free decision of the citizen, not the result of fear or purchase and sale.
Summary: The condition of “being an Iranian citizen” makes the boundary of political right clear and not subject to interpretation; and the three locks of equality, secrecy, and the prohibition of coercion, reward, and punishment transform the vote from an instrument of power into an instrument for controlling power. If properly implemented, this Article prevents the reproduction of despotism at its most fundamental point: the point at which the people must be able, without fear, to choose and replace their rulers.
Rationale of Article 18 – Administration of Elections
Article 18 is written so that elections shall not fall under the control of the very power that is meant to be restrained by the people’s vote. If the government, political parties, or military and security institutions are able to administer or control elections, elections are transformed from an instrument of popular sovereignty into an instrument for the reproduction of power. The experience of Iran has shown that despotism does not always arrive through the elimination of elections; at times it is formed by preserving the outward appearance of elections while dominating their administration. For this reason, the administration of elections must remain independent from all centers of ordinary power. The requirement of formal registration, the possibility of verification, and the right to challenge are likewise intended to ensure that no result becomes final merely through the declaration of one official or one institution. A result is legitimate only when it is open to examination and subject to adjudication.
Summary: Article 18 seeks to ensure that the ballot box truly remains an instrument of the people, not an instrument of the government. This Article is one of the most important constitutional locks against fraud and against despotism.
Rationale of Article 19 – Electoral Funding and Expenditures
Article 19 is established in order to preserve the integrity of elections, the equality of competition, and the independence of the national will. If the financial resources of elections are not transparent, recorded, and subject to review, the electoral process departs from free competition and becomes exposed to corruption, influence, and the purchase of political effect. In such a case, the result of the election may reflect not the will of the citizens, but rather financial power and unequal access to resources. The prohibition on the use of state and public resources exists so that the government and incumbent officeholders may not use assets belonging to the public in order to preserve or obtain political power. This prohibition is necessary in order to guarantee the neutrality of the government and to prevent the balance of competition from being disturbed. The prohibition on receiving support from foreign sources exists in order to safeguard national sovereignty and to prevent outside influence over the political decision of the country. Likewise, the prohibition on receiving support from military and security institutions is established in order to preserve a clear boundary between political power and coercive power, and to prevent interference with the freedom and integrity of electoral competition.
The requirement of transparency, registration, and reviewability likewise exists so that all contributions and expenditures may be subject to oversight, auditing, and legal follow up, and so that the possibility of concealment, circumvention of the law, and corruption may be reduced. The referral of limits and enforcement guarantees to the law likewise exists so that executive, supervisory, and penal mechanisms may be determined in a precise and enforceable manner.
Summary:
Article 19 guarantees that the financing of elections shall be governed by law, transparency, and oversight, so that political power may arise from the free will of the people, not from hidden money, state patronage, foreign influence, or the intervention of coercive institutions.
Rationale of Article 20 – Political Parties and Political Activity
Article 20 is established so that political competition may be removed from a hidden, personal, and unregulated condition and carried out instead through public, responsible, and reviewable institutions. Without the freedom to form and operate a political party, politics, instead of resting upon program, organization, and accountability, is transformed into informal networks, personal influence, temporary coalitions, and the acquisition of power behind the scenes. In such a condition, society loses the ability to organize its demands lawfully, and the government, instead of facing a transparent rival, is confronted with scattered and unmanageable dissatisfaction. The freedom of political parties is a necessary condition of representative government. In a free order, the people do not participate only by voting; they must also be able to organize their views, train political forces, present programs, and compete lawfully for power. The political party is the instrument by which social demands are transferred into the structure of government. If this instrument is restricted or rendered ineffective, the distance between society and the state increases, and politics moves away from the legal path toward instability, radicalism, or the monopoly of power. In this Article, the freedom of political parties and political associations is not described as absolute and unrestricted, but is made subject to observance of the Constitution and the renunciation of violence. The reason for this limitation is that political freedom must serve lawful competition, not armed subversion, intimidation, or the negation of the legal order. Accordingly, a free order is obliged to keep the field of competition open, but it is not obliged to support associations that seek to abolish lawful competition by force. This limitation clarifies the boundary between legitimate political opposition and organized action aimed at destroying the legal order through violence.
The second part of the Article, namely that the dissolution or suspension of a political party is prohibited except by judgment of a competent court, is its most important safeguard against abuse. In many despotic systems, governments use administrative tools, security measures, or political decisions to shut down opposition parties, while outwardly preserving the law but in reality destroying competition. This Article removes from the government and executive institutions the power to eliminate a rival and entrusts that power only to an independent and lawful judicial authority. In this way, the survival or removal of a political party does not depend upon the will of the ruling power, but upon legal, reasoned, and challengeable adjudication. This Article is also necessary in order to distinguish opposition from crime. In a free order, mere opposition to the government, criticism of power, or competition to obtain office is neither a crime nor a license for repression. If the government can exclude any opposition by using broad and elastic labels, then the principle of elections and political competition becomes practically ineffective. By recognizing the independent existence of political parties, Article 20 prevents political disagreement from being turned into a security پرونده. From a structural point of view as well, this Article is one of the foundations for the real implementation of Articles 15 through 19. Political competition does not remain durable without parties, elections without political organization are reduced to individuals and personalities, and governmental accountability is weakened without lawful opposition. Therefore, Article 20 is not merely an organizational right; it is one of the principal instruments of the circulation of power, the training of political elites, and the restraint of the concentration of power.
Summary:
Article 20 exists so that politics in Iran may proceed through lawful, public, and accountable institutions. This Article simultaneously secures two aims: on the one hand, it guarantees the freedom of political organization, and on the other hand, by prohibiting violence and requiring a court judgment for dissolution or suspension, it prevents either political parties from becoming instruments for disrupting the legal order, or the government from destroying political competition under the pretext of order. This Article is the legal infrastructure of enduring and nonviolent competition in a free order.
Rationale of Article 21 – Prohibition of Armed Organization
Article 21 is established so that political competition may remain within the framework of law and so that no political movement may possess, alongside party activity, instruments of coercion and force. In a free order, political legitimacy must arise solely from the vote of citizens and from lawful mechanisms. Whenever a political party or group becomes equipped with arms, military training, or a coercive organization, political competition ceases to be civil and equal and is transformed into a field of intimidation, threat, and coercive domination. The existence of an armed political organization directly disturbs the balance of powers. For in such a case, a political actor no longer competes only through program, advocacy, or social organization, but simultaneously possesses the capacity for physical, security based, or paramilitary pressure. The result of such a condition is that unarmed parties, the media, voters, and even public institutions, are in practice placed under the shadow of threat, and freedom of choice becomes meaningless. Therefore, the prohibition of armed organization is a necessary condition for real equality in political competition. This Article is also established in order to preserve the legitimate monopoly of coercive power in the hands of the lawful state. In every anti despotic order, the use of force must belong only to official, lawful, and accountable institutions, and even then under the supervision of law, parliament, and the judiciary. If political parties or groups are also permitted to possess armed organizations, the country in practice falls into a dual or multiple structure of coercive power, and the lawful authority of the state is weakened. Such a condition creates the ground for civil war, political extortion, and the collapse of public order.
The emphasis of this Article upon “formation, administration, or support” is likewise intended to close every path for circumvention of the law. The prohibition does not concern only the direct carrying of arms; it also encompasses the financing, training, organization, equipping, or support of an armed structure affiliated with a political party or movement. In this way, no political organization may create an informal arm, an affiliated force, or a paramilitary network that appears outwardly to comply with the law while in substance rendering it ineffective. The reference to an organization “possessing military training and organization” is likewise intended to ensure that the prohibition is not limited only to the stage of actual use of arms. For the principal danger lies not only in firing or armed action, but in the very creation of a structure of command, combat training, and paramilitary discipline within a political movement, since from the outset it distorts the balance of competition and creates the capacity to turn politics into violence. The Constitution must restrain this danger at the stage of its formation, not after the crisis has already occurred.
Summary: Article 21 is established so that politics may remain separate from the sphere of force, and so that political competition may take place only within the framework of law and the vote of citizens. By prohibiting armed political organizations, this Article protects the equality of competition, freedom of choice, and the stability of public order, and prevents the formation of a parallel coercive power alongside the official institutions of the state. As a result, the exercise of coercive force remains limited to the lawful and accountable institutions of the state, and no political party or movement may, by reliance upon arms, military organization, or the capacity for threat, impair the public will and the legal order.
Rationale of Article 22 – Referendum
Article 22 is established so that direct recourse to the vote of the people may be used only as a lawful, exceptional, and controllable mechanism, not as an instrument for bypassing representative institutions, stirring public emotion, or concentrating power. In a free order, a referendum may serve as a means for the direct affirmation of the national will on important matters, but if it is conducted without limitation, regulation, and oversight, it may itself become an instrument for manufacturing legitimacy for despotism. The phrase “on important national matters” is included so that the referendum remains limited to fundamental matters of public significance and does not become an instrument of continual interference in the ordinary administration of the country. The Constitution must take as its rule the governance of elected institutions and the ordinary legislative process, and accept the referendum only in cases where the subject is national, public, and decisive in character. The phrase “within the framework of the Constitution” is the most important anti despotic safeguard of this Article. It prevents the referendum from becoming an instrument for violating fundamental rights, rendering the separation of powers ineffective, eliminating judicial guarantees, or suspending the foundational principles of the system. The will of the majority, although an important source of political legitimacy, cannot be exercised outside the limits of the Constitution and against the rights and structures that protect liberty. The entrusting of administration and oversight to the National Elections Institution is intended to ensure that the process of referendum remains outside the direct control of the government, ruling parties, and interested institutions. For whenever the organizing authority is itself interested in the result, the neutrality of the process is impaired. Entrusting this matter to an independent electoral institution guarantees that registration, voting, counting, the announcement of results, and administrative review shall be conducted within a single, official, and reviewable framework.
The statement that the result is subject to objection and judicial review is likewise intended to ensure that the referendum does not remain immune from legal oversight. No public vote should be regarded as final and beyond review merely by reason of the announcement of its result. The possibility of objection and judicial review is an instrument for preventing fraud, violation, ambiguity in execution, and infringement of the rights of voters, and prevents the title of “the vote of the people” from becoming a cover for wrongdoing or political imposition. The referral of conditions and procedures to the law is likewise intended so that the necessary details, including the manner of initiating the process, thresholds, methods of campaigning, deadlines, oversight, objection, and announcement of the result, may be determined in a clear and enforceable form. The Constitution specifies the principle and the boundary, and the ordinary law elaborates the mechanism, so that legal stability may be preserved while the path of abuse through ambiguity remains closed.
Summary:
Article 22 is established so that direct recourse to the vote of the people, on important national matters, may take place only within the limits of the Constitution, under the administration of the National Elections Institution, and subject to judicial oversight. This Article both recognizes the possibility of the direct exercise of the national will and prevents the referendum from becoming an instrument for the destruction of lawful institutions, the violation of fundamental rights, or the concentration of power.
Rationale of Article 23 – The Right to Candidacy
Article 23 is established so that the right to candidacy shall be a general civic right, not a privilege that the government may grant to individuals or take away from them. If the ruling power is able, before the people cast their votes, to exclude candidates in a discretionary or political manner, elections cease to be genuinely competitive, and the people’s right of choice is in practice restricted as well. In such a case, voting remains, but the free choice among real options disappears. For this reason, this Article provides that the conditions of candidacy must be minimal, clear, objective, and non discriminatory. The condition of candidacy must not be so vague, broad, or open to interpretation that it becomes an instrument for eliminating rivals. Likewise, disqualification from candidacy must occur only on the basis of express law and only pursuant to a reasoned judgment of the Special Elections Court, so that the government, executive institutions, and security authorities may not restrict the right to candidacy through administrative or political decision.
The prohibition of disqualification on account of belief, political orientation, religion, ethnicity, language, sex, or peaceful political activity likewise exists so that electoral competition may not become an instrument for the monopoly of power. In a free order, political opposition or difference of identity is not a ground for deprivation of political rights.
Summary:
Article 23 simultaneously protects the right to be elected, the right to elect, and the balance of powers. This Article closes the path to discretionary disqualification and the engineering of elections, and guarantees that exclusion from competition shall be possible only in exceptional and lawful cases, and by independent judicial decision.