Chapter 6
The Executive Branch (Government and Prime Minister)
Rationale of Article 56 – The Prime Minister
Article 56 is established to ensure that, at the head of the government, there is a clear, unified, and accountable authority for the administration of the country. If executive power is diffused among multiple centers in a vague manner, decision making becomes slow, implementation of the law becomes inconsistent, and accountability is eroded. By designating the Prime Minister as the Head of Government and the highest executive authority of the country, this Article unifies the political and administrative leadership of the executive branch so that the country is not governed by governments with multiple voices and no clear center.
The emphasis that the direction of the executive branch, the administration of executive policies, and the issuance of the necessary orders for the implementation of the law and the administration of the country rest with him is intended to ensure that the office of Prime Minister is not merely a ceremonial title or a weak coordinating role. In a system that seeks to be effective and resistant to disorder, it must be clear who is responsible for the final decision in executive administration. This concentration of executive authority is essential for speed, coherence, and the real enforceability of decisions. The fact that the Prime Minister appoints the ministers and that their dismissal or reassignment rests with him is likewise intended to ensure that the Head of Government can genuinely direct the executive team. If the Prime Minister is responsible for administering the country but has no authority in the appointment and replacement of ministers, his responsibility becomes merely nominal, and the government is transformed into a collection of dispersed powers. This Article seeks to establish proportionality between authority and responsibility: the one who is accountable must also possess the instruments of governance. At the same time, this Article does not leave the Prime Minister without restraint. The express statement that the Prime Minister is accountable to the House of Representatives is intended to ensure that concentrated executive power does not turn into arbitrariness. That is, the Prime Minister must be able to act with strength, but not outside the control of the people’s representative body. This is the central balance of an effective parliamentary system: clear authority for execution, together with clear accountability before the House of Representatives. The anti authoritarian function of this Article lies precisely in this balance. On the one hand, the country requires a government capable of making decisions, issuing orders, and carrying them out. On the other hand, this same executive concentration, if not connected to the representative institution, may become dangerous. By combining a strong Prime Minister with parliamentary accountability, Article 56 both prevents administrative paralysis and prevents the unrestrained concentration of power.
In summary: Article 56 is intended to ensure that the executive branch has a clear, powerful, and accountable head. This Article simultaneously supports effectiveness in the administration of the country, coherence in the implementation of the law, and political accountability, and it makes the Prime Minister an effective yet restrained executive authority.
Rationale of Article 57 – Formation of the Government
Article 57 is established to ensure that the formation of the government takes place through a clear, democratic, and intelligible process, and that the selection of the head of the executive branch does not depend on personal decision, hidden bargaining, or influence exerted from outside elected institutions. When the Prime Minister is chosen from among the nominees presented by the party or coalition holding a majority in the House of Representatives, the administration of the country is directly tied to the result of the people’s choice in Parliament. This means that the government emerges from public representation, rather than from personal competition separate from Parliament.
This mechanism is intended to ensure that the Prime Minister, before assuming office, possesses both a clear political base and has demonstrated the ability to form a majority and govern the country. Under this model, the head of government is the person who, within the actual political structure, is able to obtain the necessary confidence and support. This method is more specialized and less dangerous than a system in which an individual reaches the head of the executive branch solely through nationwide campaigning and heavy expenditure; because the government is formed on the basis of real weight in the House of Representatives. The fact that the Prime Minister appoints the ministers and forms the government is likewise intended to preserve balance between responsibility and authority. If the Prime Minister is responsible for governing the country but is unable to compose his own executive team, his responsibility becomes merely nominal, and the government is transformed into a fragmented and ineffective collection. This Article states that the person who must be accountable must also have the authority to form his own team. The requirement that the commencement of the government’s term of office is subject to a vote of confidence by the House of Representatives is the most important democratic guarantee of this Article. This rule prevents the government from being formed merely through political nomination and beginning its work without the approval of the representatives of the people. A vote of confidence means that, before exercising power, the government must possess clear and public parliamentary legitimacy. This is precisely the point at which executive authority is bound to political accountability.
The final part of the Article, which provides that if, during the term, the government falls or the Prime Minister leaves office, a new government shall be formed only for the remainder of that same term, is intended to preserve order and stability in the political calendar. If every fall of a government were to begin a new term, the temporal structure of government would be disrupted and the way would be opened to political abuse. This rule prevents political crisis from becoming an instrument for the practical extension of power or for institutional disorder. At the same time, it allows a new government to be replaced swiftly without paralyzing the country.
In summary: Article 57 is intended to ensure that the formation of the government is democratic, clear, and capable of implementation. This Article connects the Prime Minister to the real majority in the House of Representatives, makes the vote of confidence a condition for the commencement of power, and, through the rule of the remainder of that same term, prevents disorder and political abuse. The result is a government that possesses both parliamentary legitimacy and the ability to be formed without ambiguity or disorder.
Rationale of Article 58 – The Government
Article 58 is established to make clear precisely through which institution the executive branch is exercised and who is responsible for the day to day administration of the country. In every political system, if the executive authority is ambiguous, responsibilities become dispersed, decision making becomes slow, and each institution may place blame on another. By expressly stating that the executive branch shall be exercised by the government, this Article clarifies the center of execution in the country and fixes responsibility.
The fact that the government consists of the Prime Minister and the ministers is intended to ensure that the executive branch is neither reduced to a single individual nor transformed into a decentralized and incoherent collection. The Prime Minister is the head and coordinator of the government, and the ministers each bear responsibility for a part of the administration of the country. This composition both provides the concentration necessary for decision making and distributes the execution of affairs among specialized officials. The determination of the principal responsibilities of the government, namely the implementation of the law, the administration of public affairs, the preservation of public order, and the execution of the budget and the executive policies of the country, is intended to ensure that the duty of the government is precise and clear. The government must not become a lawgiver, assume the place of the courts, or act outside its executive mission. This Article clarifies the boundary of the mission of the executive branch: the government exists for execution and administration, not for the seizure of all powers. The mention of the implementation of the law at the beginning of these duties is the most important anti authoritarian element of this Article. In a free system, the government is not itself the source of law, but rather the executor of the law. That means the legitimacy of executive action derives from the law, not from the personal will of the Prime Minister or the ministers. This rule prevents the executive branch from arbitrariness, personal rule, and action beyond the limits of the law.
Likewise, the express reference to the execution of the budget and the executive policies is intended to make clear that the government is responsible for the practical realization of decisions that have been approved through the lawful process. This Article turns the government into an institution of action and execution, not merely of declaration. At the same time, because the budget and the law derive their legitimacy from elsewhere, the government remains in the position of executor, not owner of the resources or author of the final rules.
In summary: Article 58 is intended to define the government as the clear and responsible authority for the execution of the affairs of the country. This Article both secures coherence in administration and keeps clear the boundary of the executive branch: the government must implement the law, not place itself in the position of the law. In this way, executive efficiency is joined with the legal restraint of power.
Rationale of Article 59 – Responsibility of the Cabinet
Article 59 is established to ensure that the government, in the exercise of executive authority, remains a single and accountable authority, and that its decisions do not become a collection of scattered and contradictory positions. If each minister could present an official decision of the government as merely the decision of someone else, or evade responsibility for a policy after its adoption, executive coherence would disappear and real accountability would become impossible. This Article is written to prevent precisely such fragmentation.
The fact that the ministers, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, constitute the Cabinet is intended to make clear that the executive branch is not merely a collection of ministries separate from one another. The Cabinet must be a single executive team working under the direction of the Prime Minister, and its decisions must ultimately be recognized as the official decisions of the government. This structure is a necessary condition for coordination in the administration of the country. The emphasis that the official decisions of the government are the joint decisions of the Cabinet, and that all ministers are responsible for them is intended to ensure that collective decision making is accompanied by collective responsibility. The government cannot decide jointly and then, at the moment of accountability, allow each part of it to evade responsibility. This rule ensures that the government remains, before the people, the House of Representatives, and the law, a single responsible body rather than a collection of officials unconnected to one another. At the same time, this Article also preserves individual responsibility. The provision that each minister, within the limits of his own duties, is separately responsible and accountable is intended to ensure that, alongside the shared responsibility of the Cabinet, the personal responsibility of ministers is not extinguished. That is, a minister may not, under the pretext of the collective nature of the government, evade accountability for the sphere of his own mission. This part preserves the necessary balance between the unity of the government and personal responsibility.
This Article also has an anti authoritarian function. In ambiguous or unaccountable systems, important decisions are sometimes taken, yet afterward no one accepts clear responsibility for them. The result is ownerless power and ineffective accountability. Article 59 closes off that condition: the government, as a whole, is responsible, and each minister is also responsible within his own sphere. In this way, neither power remains hidden nor accountability disappears.
In summary: Article 59 is intended to ensure that the Cabinet is both a coherent executive unit and a body in which each member bears clear responsibility. This Article supports coordination in the administration of the country, real accountability, and the prevention of fragmentation or the disappearance of responsibility within the executive branch.
Rationale of Article 60 – The Caretaker Government
Article 60 is established to ensure that, in the interval between the fall or conclusion of one government and the formation of a new government, the country does not fall into an executive vacuum, administrative disorder, or opportunistic political capture. Government cannot remain without an executive authority even for a few days, because the administration of daily affairs, payments, security, and the continuation of public services must be maintained. For this reason, the existing government shall remain as a caretaker government until the next government assumes office.
However, this continuation in office exists only for the preservation of continuity in the administration of the country, and not for the continuation of a full government possessing broad political authority. A government whose term has ended, which has resigned, been dismissed, or been subjected to a withdrawal of confidence by Parliament, must no longer be able to use the opportunity of the transfer of power to alter the course of the country. If such a government were to retain full authority, it could make major decisions in its final days, entrench its own forces within the structure, or bind the country to new commitments, without possessing full political backing. Article 60 is written precisely to close that path. For this reason, this Article expressly provides that the caretaker government shall be responsible only for the administration of current affairs. That means that the measures necessary for the continuity of the administration of the country, public services, and the prevention of disruption must be carried out, but the government shall have no right to use this situation for new policy making or for giving a new direction to the government. This limitation makes clear the boundary between “continuing administration” and “continuing to govern with full authority.” The prohibition of fundamental changes in public policies is intended to ensure that a government whose political legitimacy has ended cannot make major and direction setting decisions. The prohibition of high level appointments is intended to prevent an outgoing government from entrenching its own affiliates in key positions and casting a shadow over the next government. The prohibition of creating long term obligations and concluding major contracts is likewise intended to ensure that a caretaker government cannot bind the financial, administrative, or political future of the country without full political backing.
This Article is also important from an anti authoritarian standpoint, because one of the principal avenues of abuse of power arises precisely during transitional periods, when an outgoing government seeks, in the interval of political vacuum, to leave the greatest lasting effect upon the structure of the country. Article 60 transforms this period from an opportunity for influence and entrenchment into a limited and purely administrative period.
In summary: Article 60 is intended to ensure that the transfer of power is both uninterrupted and free from abuse. This Article guarantees that the country will not fall into an executive vacuum in the interval between two governments, while at the same time ensuring that the caretaker government cannot use that situation for major decisions, consequential appointments, or heavy commitments. This is the necessary balance between the continuity of the administration of the country and the prevention of abuse during the transitional period.
Rationale of Article 61 – Term Limit of the Prime Minister
Article 61 is established to ensure that the office of the Prime Minister, although it must be strong and effective, does not become a position of long term permanence and personal concentration of power. In political systems, the danger of authoritarianism does not arise only from unelected institutions. At times, an elected officeholder, or one who emerges from a majority, may also, if he remains in power for too long, gradually create networks of influence, loyalty, and administrative and political control, and disturb the balance of powers in his own favor. This Article is written to restrain precisely that danger.
The determination of the term of the Prime Minister as four years is intended to ensure that the government has sufficient time for planning, implementation, and the assessment of results. If the term is excessively short, the government will remain constantly in an atmosphere of political survival and competition and will not have adequate opportunity to govern the country effectively. Four years is a period that both allows the real implementation of policies and prevents the interval of accountability from becoming excessively long. At the same time, the rule that no person may be elected to the office of Prime Minister for more than two terms is intended to ensure that executive power is not entrenched in one individual. In this structure, the Prime Minister is not a weak or ceremonial officeholder. He is the highest executive authority of the country and the holder of real power in the administration of the government. Therefore, if this office remains in the hands of one person for prolonged periods, the danger of the personalization of power, the erosion of institutions, and the dependence of the government upon the will of one individual increases. The term limit closes that path. The express statement that this limitation applies whether consecutive or non consecutive is intended to prevent circumvention of the Article. If only consecutive terms were prohibited, one person could, by means of a brief interval or a merely formal rearrangement, in practice return to power repeatedly and reproduce the same concentration. This Article seeks to impose a real ceiling upon holding office, rather than a restriction that may easily be evaded through political maneuver.
This Article creates an important balance. On the one hand, the Prime Minister must remain in office long enough to be able to govern the country. On the other hand, he must not remain so long that the office itself becomes a platform for the accumulation of personal power. The two term limit establishes this balance: sufficient time to govern, without allowing executive power to become personal property.
In summary: Article 61 is intended to ensure that the Prime Minister can govern the country with sufficient stability and authority, yet cannot remain indefinitely at the head of the executive branch. This Article supports executive effectiveness, rotation of power, and the prevention of the formation of personal concentration of power and the erosion of the anti authoritarian structure of government.
Rationale of Article 62 – Civil Service
Article 62 is established to ensure that the administrative body of the country is not an instrument of partisan, personal, or temporary rule, but rather a professional, stable, and law governed structure for the administration of the country. If, with every political change, the executive apparatus is turned into a place for the distribution of spoils, the large scale replacement of personnel, and factional purges, the administration of the country is emptied of expertise and continuity, and the government, instead of relying on administrative order, will come to depend upon networks of personal and political loyalty. This Article is written to prevent precisely that condition.
The emphasis that the civil service must be administered on the basis of merit, law, and administrative neutrality is intended to ensure that administrative work is governed by competence and rule, rather than by proximity to power. In a system that seeks to be both effective and anti authoritarian, the recruitment and administration of the executive body must be carried out on the basis of ability, experience, and clear standards, rather than on the basis of partisan loyalty, personal relationship, or the political expediency of the government of the day. The requirement that recruitment, appointment, promotion, and dismissal must take place only on the basis of qualification and clear standards is the most important barrier against turning the executive apparatus into an instrument of political reward and punishment. If the government can make employment, promotion, or dismissal dependent upon its own political will, the administrative body will gradually change in character from public service to personal and factional service. In such a condition, the civil servant, instead of implementing the law, will be compelled to seek the satisfaction of the political superior. This Article breaks that cycle. This rule exists to ensure that the government cannot use employment, position, and administrative advancement as means of rewarding its supporters, punishing its opponents, eliminating its rivals, or distributing privilege among its affiliates. One of the enduring paths by which authoritarianism becomes entrenched is precisely that the government fills the administrative structure with dependent forces and removes opponents or neutrals. Article 62 declares that the body of the government is not the property of the ruling party and must not, with every change of power, be turned into a field of revenge or the distribution of privilege.
The requirement that government employees, in the performance of their duties, are subject only to the law is likewise necessary for preserving professional independence and the integrity of public administration. A civil servant must not be forced to choose between the law and an unlawful order, a partisan instruction, or the personal interest of a superior official. This Article seeks to make clear that, within the administrative apparatus, the final source of duty is the law, not personal will or political pressure.
In summary: Article 62 is intended to ensure that the executive apparatus of the country remains professional, neutral, and law governed, and does not become an instrument of political loyalty building and the distribution of patronage. This Article supports both the effectiveness of government and the most anti authoritarian element of public administration: that the body of government must serve the law, not party or person.
Rationale of Article 63 – Public Tendering and Public Contracts
Article 63 is established to close the principal gateway of public corruption in the administration of the country. In practice, one of the most important points at which corruption begins is precisely the field of public tenders and public contracts, where public money, public privilege, and public obligations may, instead of serving the people, be turned into instruments of patronage, political loyalty building, and organized plunder. If this field is left without rules, hidden from view, or non competitive, corruption is transformed from an exception into a norm.
The emphasis that public tenders and public contracts must be competitive, transparent, public, and subject to review is intended to ensure that no official or institution may distribute public resources behind closed doors among affiliates, favored companies, or networks of influence. The requirement that they be competitive closes the path to monopoly and predetermined award. The requirement that they be transparent and public makes possible public, media, and legal oversight. The requirement that they be subject to review means that every decision must have documentation, legal basis, and the possibility of re examination, and must not be immune from accountability. The prohibition of granting a contract or privilege on the basis of patronage, discrimination, conflict of interest, or hidden process is intended to ensure that the law does not seek merely the appearance of competition, but also guarantees its sound substance. Corruption does not usually arise only through an open violation of the law. At times, a tender is formally held, yet the result is predetermined, or the decision maker himself or those close to him are beneficiaries, or information is deliberately concealed. This Article simultaneously targets these hidden paths as well. The requirement to publish the terms, parties, amount, and principal obligations of public contracts is intended to ensure that the people and oversight institutions are able to understand what has been assigned, at what price, to whom, and with what obligation. If these principal elements remain concealed, corruption may hide beneath the cover of a formal contract, and no one will be able to detect it in time. Transparency here is not merely an administrative principle. It is a direct instrument for the prevention of corruption.
The fact that a violation of this Article constitutes public corruption and gives rise to nullification of the contract, removal from office, compensation for damages, and severe legal punishment is intended to ensure that this prohibition is not merely an ethical recommendation. In the field of public contracts, if the punishment is weak, the profit of corruption exceeds its cost. This Article deliberately establishes a strict enforcement mechanism so that the decision making official knows that abuse of public money and public privilege is not a simple administrative violation, but a direct assault upon public rights and national trust. The anti authoritarian function of this Article is also clear. Corrupt governments do not preserve themselves only through force. At times, through contracts, privileges, and the distribution of patronage, they build networks of dependency and purchase loyalty. Article 63 targets this source of nourishment for political corruption and prevents public resources from becoming an instrument for buying support, silencing rivals, or entrenching power.
In summary: Article 63 is intended to transform public tenders and public contracts from one of the most important sites of corruption production into one of the most transparent and accountable parts of the administration of the country. This Article simultaneously protects public money, public trust, and the integrity of government, and by recognizing violation of it as public corruption and providing for nullification of the contract, removal from office, compensation for damages, and severe legal punishment, it closes, to the greatest extent possible, the path to patronage and organized plunder.