Chapter 7 – The Judiciary and the Supreme Court
Rationale of Article 64 – Structure of the Judicial System
Article 64 is established to ensure that the judicial system of the country rests upon a clear, orderly, and noncircumventable foundation. If the judicial structure is not defined from the outset, political power may, by creating new institutions, exceptional bodies, or parallel channels, divert justice from its natural course. By emphasizing the unity of national law, the multi layered structure of adjudication, judicial independence, the impartiality of the courts, and judicial and administrative decentralization, this Article establishes the principal pillars of an orderly and anti authoritarian system of justice. The express designation of the courts of first instance, the provincial courts of appeal, the provincial high courts, the Supreme Court of the Country, and the Constitutional Court is intended to ensure that the hierarchy of adjudication is clear and limited. This multi layered order both makes possible the correction of error, prevents the dangerous concentration of judicial power at a single point, and preserves the people’s access to justice at the local, provincial, and national levels. The prohibition on the creation of any special, extraordinary, exceptional, revolutionary, or security court, or of any body outside this structure with the authority of judicial review or the power of issuing judicial rulings, is the most important anti authoritarian element of this Article. Experience shows that authoritarian governments usually remove political and sensitive cases from the ordinary path of justice by establishing special courts and bodies. This Article is intended precisely to close that path.
At the same time, Article 64 makes clear that administrative and specialized bodies may exist, but that they do not possess the authority of judicial review or the power of issuing judicial rulings, and that their decisions must be subject to challenge before the competent court. In other words, administrative specialization is recognized, but it does not take the place of judicial justice.
In summary: Article 64 is intended to ensure that adjudication takes place only within the framework of lawful, independent, and multi layered courts, and that no power may circumvent justice through parallel, exceptional, or administrative structures.
Rationale of Article 65 – Courts of First Instance and Provincial Courts
Article 65 is established to ensure that judicial adjudication is carried out, to the greatest extent possible, at the level closest to the people, and that all claims and disputes are not drawn to the center of the country. By establishing adjudication in the courts of first instance, the provincial courts of appeal, and the provincial high courts, this Article creates an orderly and decentralized structure so that justice may be more accessible and so that the concentration of judicial power in the capital may be prevented. In a country such as Iran, where the danger of administrative and political centralization is high, this organized dispersion is an important anti authoritarian instrument.
The emphasis of Article 65 that, in each province, the provincial high court is the highest judicial authority of that province is intended to ensure that the province is not merely an executor of the decisions of the center, but rather possesses real judicial capacity within the framework of the unity of national law. The express provision that this court shall supervise the uniform application of the law in the courts of the province is likewise intended to prevent disorder in the interpretation and application of the law. If, within one province, courts follow entirely contradictory approaches in similar matters, the legal security of the people is lost and justice becomes a matter of chance. The provision for five judges on the provincial high court follows the same logic. Article 65 does not seek for this authority to be so small that it may easily come under the control of one or two persons, nor so large that it becomes unnecessarily burdensome, costly, and slow. This composition creates a balanced limit between efficiency, deliberation, and resistance to influence. Likewise, the election of the judges of this court by the vote of the absolute majority of the assembly of judges of that same province is intended to ensure that the judges of the provincial high court arise from within the judicial body of that same province, and are not merely imposed from outside or from the center. The fact that the Chief of the provincial high court is selected from among the judges of that same court and for a limited and non renewable term, and that his presidency is of an administrative nature, is intended to prevent the emergence of chief centered rule within the court itself. Article 65 intends that the Chief be an administrative manager, not a judicial commander. For this reason, the presidency must not become a form of judicial superiority over the other members or an instrument of domination over the decisions of the court.
The final part of Article 65, which permits the removal, suspension, or transfer of the judges of this court before the end of their term only within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, is intended to preserve the independence and security of tenure of the judges. A judge who knows that he may easily be removed or transferred becomes vulnerable to political, administrative, or local pressure. In this respect, Article 65 seeks to protect the provincial high judge against outside pressure so that judicial decision may follow the law, rather than fear.
In summary: Article 65 is intended to ensure that adjudication in Iran is province based, accessible, orderly, and anti centralization. By strengthening the courts of first instance and the provincial authorities, this Article both brings justice closer to the people and prevents the accumulation of judicial power in the center, and also, by relatively guaranteeing the independence of provincial judges, prevents political and administrative influence over adjudication.
Rationale of Article 66 – The Supreme Court of the Country
Article 66 is established to ensure that, alongside the provincial structure of adjudication, there also exists a supreme national authority in order to prevent dangerous fragmentation in the interpretation and application of the law. If each provincial high court were to follow its own understanding without a final authority, the country would gradually face multiple differing lines of precedent, and the unity of national law would be undermined. Article 66 restrains this problem through the establishment of the Supreme Court of the Country. The principal logic of Article 66 is that the Supreme Court of the Country should not itself be a court of general jurisdiction for all claims, but rather the supreme authority for the supervision of the uniform application of the law throughout the country, for adjudicating appeals in cassation in the cases prescribed, and for resolving اختلافات in the interpretation and application of the law among the provincial high courts. In this way, Article 66 both prevents legal disorder and prevents all cases from being drawn to the center. The provision for 11 judges likewise follows the logic of balance. Article 66 does not seek for the Supreme Court of the Country to be so small that it may easily come under the control of one faction, nor so large that it becomes slow, costly, and ineffective. This number is a moderate and defensible limit for preserving collective deliberation, reducing the danger of influence, and at the same time maintaining efficiency.
The fact that Article 66 grants the Supreme Court of the Country the authority to quash or affirm judgments contrary to law is intended to preserve the supremacy of law over judicial preference. That is, the role of this authority is to correct legal deviations and preserve national coherence in the application of the law, not to transform itself into another general court. For this reason, Article 66 expressly provides that the Supreme Court of the Country is not a court of general jurisdiction for all claims.
In summary: Article 66 is intended to ensure that, within the judicial system of the country, there exists a supreme national authority which, without absorbing all cases, safeguards the uniform application of the law, the unity of legal interpretation, and the control of judgments contrary to law. Article 66 is both a guarantor of the unity of national law and a barrier against the excessive concentration of adjudication in the center.
Rationale of Article 67 – The Constitutional Court
Article 67 is established so that the Constitution shall not remain merely a symbolic or political text, but shall instead possess real enforceability. If no independent institution exists to safeguard the Constitution, Parliament, the government, or other public institutions may, through the enactment of laws or regulations, effectively violate the limits of the Constitution, while no effective authority exists to prevent such violation. Article 67 fills this gap by establishing the Constitutional Court. The independence of the Constitutional Court from the Supreme Court of the Country also rests on this same logic. Article 67 does not seek for the highest authority in ordinary judicial matters to be, at the same time, the final authority in constitutional matters as well, because these two functions are different in nature. The Supreme Court of the Country must supervise the application of the law in ordinary cases and preserve judicial coherence, whereas the Constitutional Court must serve as the guardian of the supremacy of the Constitution over all laws and regulations. This separation both prevents the excessive concentration of power in a single authority and creates institutional clarity. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to review the conformity of laws and regulations with the Constitution is intended to ensure that no law or regulation may stand above the Constitution. Its jurisdiction to provide the interpretation of the Constitution is likewise intended to prevent conflicting and political readings of the constitutional text. Likewise, the resolution of jurisdictional disputes among the high public institutions is provided for in Article 67 so that conflict among the important institutions of the country shall not become a permanent crisis of power, and so that a neutral authority shall exist for final adjudication. The part concerning nullification is also among the most important parts of Article 67. If the Constitutional Court had only the power to express an opinion, but could not render ineffective a law or regulation that is contrary to the Constitution, then in practice its power to defend the Constitution would remain incomplete. By expressly providing that the Constitutional Court, upon finding inconsistency, shall nullify all or the inconsistent part of the law or regulation, Article 67 guarantees that the safeguarding of the Constitution will not remain merely at the level of recommendation and warning.
The prohibition on simultaneous membership of the members of the Constitutional Court in the Supreme Court of the Country, the government, Parliament, the executive leadership of political parties, the armed forces, and the security institutions is also intended to preserve the independence and impartiality of this authority. Article 67 seeks to ensure that the body which decides upon the limits of the powers of the high institutions is not itself under the influence of those same institutions. Otherwise, constitutional adjudication would be transformed into an instrument of political or security rivalry.
In summary: Article 67 is intended to ensure that the Constitution has real institutional support against ordinary legislation, executive regulations, and conflicts among the institutions of power. In the logic of Article 67, the Constitutional Court is the guardian of the supremacy of the Constitution, the final authority for its interpretation, and the instrument for preventing the high institutions from evading constitutional limits. Without Article 67, the Constitution may remain written, but it would lack effective enforceability.
Rationale of Article 68 – Nomination Panels for Judges of the High Courts
Article 68 is established to ensure that entry into the Supreme Court of the Country and the Constitutional Court does not pass through a personal decision, a single political institution, or a behind the scenes bargain. The logic of Article 68 is that, before final selection, there must exist an intermediate and specialized body that examines and screens the nominees so that only qualified persons reach the final stage. In this way, both the direct imposition of a nominee is prevented, and the final selection is made from among several real options, rather than from a single predetermined name.
The 9 member composition of the panel is also designed on this basis. The presence of 3 members from the House of Representatives is intended to ensure that the element of public representation is present in the process, but that this presence is not by itself decisive. The presence of 3 members from the National Bar Association is intended to ensure that an independent professional legal and advocacy perspective enters the process. The presence of 3 members from among retired or experienced judges is likewise intended to ensure that judicial experience and practical knowledge of judicial qualification are present at this stage. Article 68 seeks to establish a balance among the element of limited political representation, professional independence, and judicial experience. The fact that the Nomination Panel, for each seat, presents 3 qualified nominees is intended to prevent two dangers. The first danger is the imposition of a single nominee. The second danger is the abandonment of the final selection to a mass of disordered and unstructured names. Article 68 seeks to ensure that the final selection is real, but not without rule. The presentation of 3 nominees for each seat means both that the possibility of choice remains, and that the process does not become merely theatrical or arbitrary. The requirement that the validity of the panel’s decision depends on the vote of at least 6 members is likewise intended to ensure that no faction or limited group may alone take control of the screening process. Article 68 deliberately raises the decision threshold so that the final nominee is the product of relative consensus, rather than the result of the domination of a limited bloc. This part of Article 68 plays an important role in restraining influence and collusion.
The prohibition on simultaneous membership of members of the Nomination Panel in the government, Parliament, the executive leadership of political parties, the armed forces, and the security institutions is also intended to preserve the impartiality of the process. Article 68 seeks to ensure that those who play a role in the screening stage are not themselves active affiliates of centers of political, partisan, or security power. Likewise, the prohibition of the imposition of a nominee and the domination of the nomination process is intended to ensure that authoritarianism is restrained at the very gateway of entry into the high judicial authorities.
In summary: Article 68 is intended to ensure that entry into the high judicial authorities takes place neither by the will of one person nor by the decision of one single institution, but rather through a multi source, specialized, and anti influence panel. The logic of Article 68 is that the independence of the Supreme Court of the Country and the Constitutional Court is not preserved only at the stage of removal and during the term of office. From the very stage of nomination and screening of candidates, concentration, imposition, and political engineering must be prevented.
Rationale of Article 69 – Selection and Term of Office of Judges of the High Courts
Article 69 is established to ensure that entry into the Supreme Court of the Country and the Constitutional Court takes place neither by the will of one person nor through hasty decision making, but rather, after passing through the nomination stage set forth in Article 68, is finalized through a weighty yet limited political decision. The assignment of final selection to the Senate by a vote of two thirds of the members of the Senate is intended to ensure that no simple and temporary majority may, by itself, determine the judges of the high courts. The logic of Article 69 is that a high judge must pass through a filter of professional screening and then be selected through broad consensus, rather than through the victory of one political faction.
The difference in the length of membership is likewise deliberate in Article 69. The determination of 9 years for the judges of the Supreme Court of the Country and 12 years for the judges of the Constitutional Court is based upon the difference in the role of these two authorities. The Supreme Court of the Country deals with ordinary matters, cassation, and the uniform application of the law, and therefore requires stability, but the Constitutional Court, because of its more sensitive role in safeguarding the Constitution, interpreting it, and nullifying inconsistent laws, requires greater temporal independence. By means of this distinction, Article 69 establishes a balance between institutional stability and the prevention of excessively prolonged tenure. The emphasis of Article 69 on the non renewable character of the terms is also an important anti authoritarian lock. If a judge holds hope for renewal, he may in his final years look toward the selecting institutions, and the independence of his judgment may thereby be impaired. By closing the path to renewal, Article 69 seeks to ensure that the high judge remains faithful during his service to the law, rather than to those in power who may determine his future. The rule that no person may serve more than once as a member of these authorities is likewise intended to prevent the formation of enduring circles of influence. Article 69 does not seek for membership in the high courts to become a returnable path that generates networks and accumulates power. One term of membership, for a long period and without renewal, strengthens independence and prevents dependence upon a political future. The part concerning the gradual and non simultaneous expiration of terms is likewise intended to preserve institutional stability and to restrain sudden capture. If all members were replaced at the same time, a political wave could in a short period take control of the entire Supreme Court of the Country or the Constitutional Court. Through this design, Article 69 seeks to ensure that some members always remain, so that they may preserve institutional memory, experience, and internal balance. For this reason, the expiration of terms is arranged for the Supreme Court of the Country once every 3 years, and for the Constitutional Court once every 4 years.
The requirement that, in the event of rejection of the nominated candidates, the Nomination Panel of the same authority must introduce new candidates within 30 days is also intended to prevent deadlock and institutional paralysis. Article 69 does not seek to allow the selecting institution, through repeated rejection of candidates, to keep seats vacant and thereby weaken the high authority. This part preserves institutional continuity and prevents political gamesmanship through vacancies.
In summary: Article 69 is intended to ensure that the selection of the judges of the high courts is carried out through high consensus, long but non renewable terms, and gradual and non simultaneous replacement. The logic of Article 69 is that the independence of high judges is not secured merely by prohibiting interference. The method of selection and the duration of membership must themselves be designed in such a way that the paths of political influence, dependence upon renewal, and the sudden capture of the high courts are closed.
Rationale of Article 70 – Council for Judicial Administration and Discipline
Article 70 is established to ensure that judicial administration and the discipline of judges do not fall under the control of one person, one political office, or one single center. Experience shows that judicial independence is not preserved merely by prohibiting interference in a judgment. At times, the principal pressure is exerted through transfer, promotion, disciplinary proceedings, or the threat of suspension and removal. Article 70 seeks to remove these instruments from a personal and centralized framework and to place them within a collective and legally confined structure.
The central logic of Article 70 is to establish a distinction between the substance of judicial rulings and the administration and discipline of judges. The Council for Judicial Administration and Discipline and the provincial judicial disciplinary bodies have no authority to interfere in the substance of judicial rulings. That is, they are not intended to decide in place of the judge or to determine the outcome of a case. Their function is limited solely to the administrative and disciplinary affairs of judges. This distinction is intended both to preserve independence of judgment and to ensure that no judge remains immune from professional and disciplinary accountability. An important refinement of Article 70 is that all disciplinary power is not concentrated at the national level. In the revised version, a provincial judicial disciplinary body is established in each province so that matters concerning provincial judges may, to the greatest extent possible, be addressed within that same province. This part of Article 70 is more anti authoritarian, because it does not allow the center to control all judges in the country directly from above. If all judicial discipline were placed in the hands of a single national institution, that same institution could become a new bottleneck of power. By distributing authority between the national level and the provincial level, Article 70 seeks to restrain this danger.
The 9 member composition of the Council for Judicial Administration and Discipline is also designed to break monopoly. The presence of 3 members from among experienced judges, 3 members from among experienced lawyers, and 3 members from among distinguished professors of law is intended to ensure that the administration and discipline of judges remain neither monopolized by the judicial body itself, nor placed in the hands of politics, nor controlled by a single profession. The same logic appears in the 5 member composition of the provincial disciplinary body as well: 2 judges, 1 experienced lawyer, 1 professor of law, and 1 retired experienced judge. This composition ensures that disciplinary decisions are neither purely internal to the profession, nor merely administrative, nor purely political. The provision for the gradual and non simultaneous expiration of terms is also intended to prevent sudden capture of the institution. If all members were replaced at the same time, one political current or a temporary coalition could seize the entire institution in a single stage. By means of staggered expiration of terms, Article 70 preserves institutional stability and organizational memory and prevents severe political fluctuations. The prohibition on simultaneous membership of members in the government, Parliament, the executive leadership of political parties, the armed forces, and the security institutions is likewise intended to preserve the distance of this institution from centers of power. For an institution that decides the professional future of judges, if it is itself dependent upon those same centers of power, can easily become an instrument of pressure. Article 70 seeks to preserve this institutional distance.
Another important point in Article 70 is that the Council for Judicial Administration and Discipline serves as the authority for hearing appeals against the decisions of the provincial judicial disciplinary bodies. This part is necessary for balancing decentralization and unity of standards. If only a provincial authority exists, decisions may become local, discretionary, or inconsistent. If only a national authority exists, dangerous concentration is created. By granting original authority to the province and appellate authority to the national level, Article 70 establishes a balance between these two needs.
In summary: Article 70 is intended to ensure that judicial administration and the discipline of judges are at once independent, decentralized, and accountable. The revised philosophy of Article 70 is that judicial independence is not secured merely by prohibiting interference in judgment. The administrative and disciplinary instruments of pressure must also be removed from the hands of a single center. For this reason, by means of a multi source composition, a distribution of authority between the national and provincial levels, and a prohibition of interference in the substance of judicial rulings, Article 70 seeks both to prevent administrative authoritarianism and to preserve the professional order of the judiciary.
Rationale of Article 71 – Budget and Financial Administration of the Council for Judicial Administration and Discipline
Article 71 is established to ensure that the Council for Judicial Administration and Discipline is not independent in name only, but is also able in practice to function without financial and administrative dependence upon the government or any other authority. If an institution is responsible for judicial administration and the discipline of judges, but its budget, secretariat, and personnel remain in the hands of others, its independence becomes merely nominal. Article 71 is designed to prevent precisely that dependence.
The logic of Article 71 is that institutional independence is not secured solely by defining jurisdiction and the composition of membership; the source of funding and administrative management are also part of real independence. An institution whose budget may at any time be reduced or withheld by another is exposed to pressure, even if it is described on paper as independent. For this reason, Article 71 expressly provides that the Council for Judicial Administration and Discipline must have an independent budget, an independent secretariat, and independent administrative personnel. The financing of its budget from the general budget of the country is likewise intended to keep the Council removed from private sources, ad hoc assistance, or informal dependence upon persons or institutions. At the same time, Article 71 does not seek to allow the Council to demand any amount at will. For this reason, the standards of legal duties, workload, ordinary administrative needs, and the principle of economy and efficiency are included in the text. The philosophy of this part is to establish a balance between independence and financial accountability; that is, the Council must neither remain under pressure nor fall outside oversight and financial discipline. The requirement that the proposed budget of the Council be entered separately in the budget bill is intended to prevent it from being concealed, absorbed, or rendered ineffective within the budgets of other institutions. Article 71 seeks to ensure that the financial status of this Council remains clear, visible, and incapable of circumvention. If its budget is dissolved into general and ambiguous appropriations, the path to pressure and manipulation is reopened. Another important part of Article 71 is the prohibition of effective reduction, delay in allocation, or restriction of budget execution as instruments of pressure. The philosophy of this rule is that pressure upon an independent institution is not always exercised by direct order; at times it is exercised by restricting money, personnel, facilities, and administrative support. Article 71 recognizes this hidden form of pressure as well and seeks to close it in advance.
The requirement that revenues and expenditures be transparent and that they be examined by the independent public auditing authority of the country is likewise intended to ensure that financial independence does not turn into financial irresponsibility. Article 71 does not seek to make the Council dependent, but neither does it seek to remove it from auditing and accountability. The logic of Article 71 is that an independent institution must be both protected from pressure and accountable under the law and to public audit.
In summary: Article 71 is intended to ensure that the Council for Judicial Administration and Discipline is truly independent in financial and administrative terms, and not merely in appearance. By providing for an independent budget, an independent secretariat, clear standards for determining the budget, prohibition of pressure through the budget, and independent public audit, Article 71 seeks to establish a balance between institutional independence and financial discipline. Without Article 71, the independence of the Council established in Article 70 may in practice be neutralized through financial and administrative means.
Rationale of Article 72 – Qualifications and Independence of Members
Article 72 rests on the idea that a high judge and a member of the institution for judicial administration and discipline must not only possess legal knowledge; they must also stand, in personal, financial, political, and institutional terms, in a position that enables them to decide freely and impartially. For this reason, Article 72 does not speak only of high legal and judicial qualification, but also makes integrity, independence of judgment, political impartiality, and commitment to the Constitution conditions as well. The logic of Article 72 is that, at the summit of the judicial structure, knowledge without independence is insufficient, and independence without integrity cannot endure.
The prohibition on membership in, or active affiliation with, political parties, the armed forces, the security institutions, and the holding of political or executive office, exists so that the highest judicial decision makers do not become an extension of the arm of power. Article 72 seeks to ensure that the authority which must stand against evasion of the law, violation of the rights of the people, or excess by the institutions of power, is not itself dissolved within the network of those same powers. The philosophy of this prohibition is to preserve institutional and psychological distance between the judiciary and the centers of power; for wherever that distance disappears, impartiality gradually disappears as well. But the part concerning the prohibition of commercial and profit making activity is, in philosophical terms, even deeper. A judge, or a member of a high judicial institution, is not threatened only by political power; economic power can also make him dependent, cautious, indebted, or overly deferential. Commerce operates on the basis of profit, negotiation of advantage, risk, competition, network building, and at times credit and contractual dependence, whereas adjudication must rest upon impartiality, distance from personal interest, and exclusive fidelity to the law. These two logics come into conflict at a sensitive point.
The philosophy of prohibiting commercial and profit making activity in Article 72 is that a high judge must not be placed in a position where his mind becomes involuntarily engaged with the calculation of personal profit and loss, relations with partners, the market, contracts, capital, debt, or his own economic future. Even if direct corruption does not occur, this very economic entanglement may affect judgment. A person engaged in commerce may:
- fear a decision that could harm his own economic interests or those of persons close to him
- become more lenient or more severe toward particular economic actors
- unconsciously view legal matters through the logic of bargaining and financial expediency
- be exposed to hidden influence through partnership, credit, loans, contracts, or economic intermediaries
Thus, the commercial prohibition exists not only to close the path to bribery; it exists to close the path to mental and structural dependency. Article 72 understands that corruption is not always cash in an envelope; at times, an ongoing economic relationship, the hope of future gain, or the fear of personal loss, quietly and gradually erodes independence. In this respect, Article 72 is not merely an anti corruption rule; it is a principle against the transformation of adjudication into the calculation of advantage. A high judge must be secured and limited, in livelihood and status, in such a way that he has no need to build, outside his office, a parallel economic identity. Its philosophy is that the holder of high judicial office is neither a merchant, nor a political actor, nor a hidden partner of power; he is the trustee of the law. The trustee of the law must have only one final loyalty: the Constitution and legal justice.
The final part of Article 72, which prohibits political pressure, security interference, hidden conflicts of interest, and organized influence, is in truth the logical result of all these same foundations. When Article 72 arranges the personal and institutional conditions of independence, it must at the same time close the external paths by which that independence may be destroyed. For independence is not only a moral virtue; it is a protected institutional condition.
In summary: Article 72 is intended to ensure that the members of the highest judicial and disciplinary institutions of the country stand, in legal, political, financial, and institutional terms, in a position that enables them to decide without fear, exchange, self interest, or dependence. The philosophy of prohibiting commercial and profit making activity in Article 72 is that high adjudication must not be contaminated by the logic of the market, profit, partnership, and personal gain; for wherever a judge enters into a network of interest, justice, even if it appears outwardly to remain, is inwardly damaged.
Rationale of Article 73 – Suspension and Removal of Judges
Article 73 is established to ensure that the suspension and removal of a judge do not become instruments of political, administrative, or personal pressure. If a judge knows that he may be removed by the will of an official or by a hasty decision, judicial independence in practice disappears. On the other hand, if no effective means exists for addressing corruption, grave violation of the law, or persistent incapacity, the judiciary is drawn toward irresponsibility and unlimited immunity. Article 73 is written to create a balance between these two dangers.
For this reason, Article 73 expressly provides that no judge may be suspended or removed except through a fair, public, and impartial proceeding. The logic of this part is clear: the professional fate of a judge must not be determined by administrative order, hidden case building, or the will of political power. Suspension and removal are legitimate only when carried out on the basis of a clear, defensible, and just legal process. With respect to judges of the courts of first instance, the provincial courts of appeal, and the provincial high courts, Article 73 entrusts the authority of initial review to the judicial disciplinary body of that same province. The philosophy of this design is to prevent the complete concentration of disciplinary power in the center. If the fate of all judges in the country is determined directly by a single national institution, that institution itself becomes a dangerous bottleneck of pressure and influence. By assigning initial review to the province, Article 73 seeks to preserve local independence and the decentralized character of the judicial system. At the same time, Article 73 makes the decision of the provincial body subject to appeal before the Council for Judicial Administration and Discipline. The logic of this part is that decentralization must not lead to disorder, local arbitrariness, or the absence of effective oversight. Thus, Article 73 strikes a balance between two needs: on the one hand, preventing the concentration of power in the center, and on the other hand, preserving common standards and the possibility of national oversight. With respect to judges of the Supreme Court of the Country and the Constitutional Court, Article 73 imposes a stricter standard. These judges stand at the highest level of the judicial system, and their suspension or removal may have national and constitutional consequences. For this reason, their temporary suspension is possible only in the case of a serious criminal accusation, substantial evidence of corruption, or a clear danger to the integrity of adjudication, and only by a vote of two thirds of the members of the Council for Judicial Administration and Discipline. The logic of this strictness is that even temporary suspension must not become an easy means for removing or politically pressuring high judges.
Article 73 is even stricter with regard to the removal of judges of the Supreme Court of the Country and the Constitutional Court, and makes it conditional upon a lawful proceeding and a vote of two thirds of the members of the Senate. The philosophy of this part is that the dismissal of a high judge must not be treated as merely an administrative or disciplinary decision, but must pass through a heavy institutional threshold so that the removal of independent judges under seemingly lawful pretexts becomes difficult.
In summary: Article 73 is intended to ensure that the suspension and removal of a judge are neither easy and arbitrary nor so difficult that accountability disappears. The logic of Article 73 rests upon the preservation of judicial independence, the guarantee of a fair proceeding, and the prevention of disciplinary instruments from becoming tools of intimidation. Article 73 seeks to protect the judge against pressure, while also ensuring that he remains accountable in the face of corruption and misconduct.