Chapter 11 – Armed Forces, Security, and Public Order
Rationale of Article 102 – National Army
Article 102 is established to ensure that the Army remains in its true place: a force for the defense of the country, not an actor of power within the country. The experience of many countries has shown that wherever the armed forces depart from their defensive mission and enter politics, the economy, or competition for power, the way is opened to authoritarianism, coups, a hidden state, and public fear. By defining the Army as a national, professional, non partisan force subject to the Constitution, this Article separates its identity from the outset from any kind of ideological, personal, sectarian, or individual and party based force. The emphasis that the duty of the Army is only the defense of the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the country against external threats exists in order to close the path to the internal use of military force. In an anti authoritarian system, the Army must not become an instrument for governing society, controlling domestic politics, or engineering power. The duty of the Army is defense against the foreign enemy, not intervention in the political life of the nation. By this clear limitation, Article 102 preserves the boundary between national defense and internal power. The express statement that the Army and the other institutions and units of the armed forces absolutely have no right to enter politics or to interfere in elections, legislation, adjudication, the administration of internal affairs, partisan activity, the media, and the exertion of pressure upon public institutions is the anti authoritarian heart of Article 102. The reason for this prohibition is clear: a force that possesses weapons, organization, discipline, and the capacity to use coercion destroys free political competition if it enters politics. In such a condition, neither parties, nor elections, nor the media, nor even Parliament can remain free. Therefore, for the protection of civilian government and free political competition, Article 102 keeps the armed forces entirely outside the sphere of politics. This Article also cuts off one of the most important roots of authoritarianism by providing that the loyalty of the armed forces is only to the country, the Constitution, and the democratic legal order, and not to any individual, dynasty, party, religion, ideology, or particular group. Authoritarianism usually begins where the armed forces, instead of being loyal to the law, become loyal to a particular person, leader, dynasty, or doctrine. By transferring the axis of loyalty from persons and groups to the Constitution and the democratic legal order, Article 102 prevents the Army from becoming the guard of personal or sectarian power. The emphasis that formation, organization, training, appointment, promotion, and command in the armed forces must be based upon professional merit, legal discipline, and commitment to the Constitution exists in order to prevent political, ideological, and factional influence within the structure of the Army. If command and promotion are based on personal or political loyalty, the Army is transformed from a national institution into a network of power. Article 102 seeks to ensure that the armed forces are governed on the basis of expertise, law, and professional duty, and not on the basis of relationship, ideology, and dependence.
Another important part of Article 102 is the prohibition of any economic, commercial, financial, banking, investment, contracting, or business activity by the Army, the other institutions and units of the armed forces, or institutions affiliated with them. This prohibition exists so that the Army does not become an independent economic power. An armed force that enters trade, contracting, banking, and economic empire gradually becomes independent from both the government and the nation, buys influence in politics, builds media, creates a support network, and becomes difficult to restrain. By closing the path to business activity and to a network of political and administrative influence, Article 102 prevents the formation of a state within the state.
In summary: Article 102 seeks to ensure that the Army remains only a national army, that is, the defensive force of the country, not a partner in political power, not an economic actor, and not an instrument of internal domination. The anti authoritarian function of Article 102 lies in the fact that it both clarifies the boundary of the mission of the Army, keeps it away from politics and the economy, limits its loyalty to the Constitution, and prevents the armed forces from becoming a rival center of power against the nation and the elected institutions.
Rationale of Article 103 – Command of the Armed Forces and Parliamentary Oversight
Article 103 is established to ensure that the armed forces, despite their vital importance for the defense of the country, never become an independent, arbitrary power or a rival to the elected government and the nation. In every anti authoritarian system, the mere existence of an army is not enough. More important than that is the legal and political restraint of military power. Article 103 is written precisely for this purpose: it places the command of the armed forces in the hands of the elected government, while at the same time restraining it under parliamentary oversight and clear legal rules. The emphasis that the command of the armed forces belongs to the elected government and is exercised through the Prime Minister and the Minister responsible for defense exists in order to secure the principle of civilian rule over the army. The meaning of this rule is that the armed forces must serve a power that arises from the vote of the people and is answerable before the national institutions, and not autonomous commanders, hidden circles, or independent centers of influence. By entrusting the administration, command, readiness, and deployment of the armed forces to the government, Article 103 preserves defensive effectiveness and prevents the dangerous duality between government and army. At the same time, in order to prevent the personalization of the head of the army, Article 103 provides that the Chief of the General Staff, or the highest military authority, may be appointed only upon the proposal of the government and with the approving vote of three fifths of the legal membership of the Senate. This arrangement exists so that the government may exercise its defensive command, but may not turn the head of the army into a merely personal or partisan appointment. Likewise, the fixed term of this office and the limitation on its renewal prevent the formation of networks of personal loyalty and the long term concentration of military power in the hands of one person.
The provision that the removal of this officeholder is possible only upon the proposal of the government and with the approving vote of three fifths of the legal membership of the House of Representatives exists to create a balance between stability and accountability. The highest military commander must not become a person beyond political and national control. Yet at the same time, his removal must not be so easy that it becomes an instrument of political settling of scores. By this mechanism, Article 103 prevents both arbitrary command and permanent instability at the head of the army. This Article also makes clear that the appointment, removal, and transfer of commanders of the armed forces, apart from the head of the army, belong to the government and are exercised through the Minister responsible for defense and the lawful chain of command. The reason for this rule is that the government must be able truly to administer the army and possess the operational and organizational authority necessary for maintaining defensive readiness. At the same time, because this authority is exercised within the limits of the law and through the lawful chain of command, the paths to arbitrariness, personal purges, and factional loyalties are closed. Entrusting the budget of the armed forces to the House of Representatives is one of the most important anti authoritarian instruments of Article 103. The budget is not merely a financial matter. The budget is the real measure of power. Any armed force that can receive resources, arm itself, or expand its structure without the control of the representatives of the people will gradually move beyond the oversight of the nation. For this reason, Article 103 expressly provides that defensive, organizational, training, armament, and future oriented defense expenditures must be examined and approved in the House of Representatives so that military power may not expand without the consent of the representatives of the people. Article 103 does not stop with command and budget, but also makes the army internally anti coup and resistant to deviation. For this reason, training within the armed forces must be based upon loyalty to the Constitution, the sovereignty of the people, civilian government, and the prohibition of intervention in politics. This rule exists so that the organizational culture of the army is formed from the outset around law and nation, and not around personal obedience, ideological zeal, or intervention in internal power. The requirement that all commanders, officers, and other personnel swear an oath of loyalty to the Constitution, the nation, and the democratic legal order likewise serves this same purpose. Article 103 seeks to ensure that the basis of obedience in the army is not the will of an individual, but the Constitution and the nation. In such a structure, command is legitimate, but its legitimacy comes from law, not from the personality of the commander. One of the most important parts of Article 103 is that it requires all members of the armed forces to reject and report any order manifestly contrary to the Constitution, involving a coup, action against the lawful government, aggression against the sovereignty of the people, or disruption of the lawful transfer of power. The importance of this clause lies in the fact that it closes the path of justifying crime and coup under the title of “obedience to orders.” Article 103 declares that the final loyalty of the soldier is to the Constitution, and not to an unlawful command. This clause transforms the army from an instrument of coup into an obstacle to coup.
Likewise, the prohibition of any plainclothes force or operative, the prohibition on mobilization and movement outside the lawful chain of command, and the requirement that major decisions be recorded and subject to review, exist in order to close the path to covert operations, internal intimidation, and the secret use of military power. In an anti authoritarian system, the armed force must be visible, responsible, and reviewable, not hidden, nameless, and beyond accountability.
In summary: Article 103 seeks to ensure that the armed forces are strong in the defense of the country, yet fully restrained before the Constitution, the lawful government, the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the nation. The anti authoritarian function of Article 103 lies in the fact that it preserves the operational power of the government, makes the head of the army term bound and controllable, places the budget under the control of the representatives of the people, keeps the authority of administration and transfer of commanders within the lawful structure of the government, and, within the army itself, institutionalizes a culture of loyalty to law and rejection of coup orders.
Rationale of Article 104 – Prohibition of Coup d’État and Invalidity of Unlawful Orders
Article 104 is established so that no military or security force may act against the Constitution, the elected institutions, elections, or the lawful transfer of power. In every anti authoritarian system, it is not enough merely that the army and the security forces remain under the supervision of the government. It must also be stated expressly that every coup d’état, conspiracy, incitement, or order aimed at overthrowing the lawful order of the country is prohibited and constitutes a grave offense. This Article is established in order to close precisely that path. The emphasis that every order manifestly contrary to the Constitution or the law is null and unenforceable exists so that no official or agent may justify an unlawful act under the title of “superior orders.” In a system that seeks to remain anti authoritarian, the legitimacy of a command comes from the law, not from the rank of the person who issued it. For this reason, Article 104 expressly provides that obedience to a manifestly unlawful order does not remove responsibility. This Article also prohibits the use of the armed forces, the police, and the intelligence institutions for partisan, electoral, political repression, public intimidation, or the preservation of power contrary to law. The reason for this prohibition is clear: if the instruments of coercion are placed in the service of political competition or the unlawful preservation of power, then neither free elections nor lawful government can remain. Article 104 therefore establishes a clear boundary between the preservation of lawful order and the abuse of coercive power.
In summary: Article 104 is the direct shield of the Constitution against coup d’état and the unlawful order. This Article both criminalizes action against the lawful order, deprives the unlawful order of legal force, and closes the path to the political and authoritarian misuse of the armed and security institutions.
Rationale of Article 105 – National Police and Internal Security
Article 105 is established so that the police shall be an instrument for the preservation of public order and the protection of the rights and freedoms of the people, and not a means of political repression and domination over society. In an anti authoritarian system, the police must be a national, professional, non partisan, and civilian institution, and must operate under the authority of the elected government, and not under the influence of a party, group, or parallel institutions. For this reason, this Article both clarifies the lawful position of the police and restricts the limits of its authority. The emphasis that the administration, command, and organization of the police belong to the elected government is intended to ensure that responsibility for internal security remains in the hands of a government that derives from the vote of the people and is accountable before the public institutions. At the same time, entrusting the budget of the police to the proposal of the government and the approval of the House of Representatives is intended to ensure that the police force does not expand without the oversight of the representatives of the people and does not become a financial and organizational power outside public control. By prohibiting the transformation of the police into a force of political repression, an instrument of partisan power, or an organization of security penetration into society, Article 105 closes one of the most important paths to authoritarianism. If the police enters political competition, elections, partisan activity, or pressure upon the media, associations, unions, and peaceful assemblies, public security is no longer distinct from public freedom, and the police is transformed from a servant of the law into an instrument of fear. This Article exists in order to prevent precisely that deviation. The provision for riot control units and other special units for the preservation of order only within the structure of the national police is likewise intended to ensure that the government possesses a lawful instrument in the face of riot and widespread violence, yet that this instrument does not become a separate, arbitrary, or repressive force. Likewise, the prohibition of any plainclothes force or operative exists so that no hidden, anonymous, and unaccountable power may act in society in the name of the police.
The emphasis that the use of force, weapons, arrest, search, surveillance, and every act restricting rights and freedoms is possible only within the limits of the law, to the extent of necessity, and under judicial oversight, exists in order to preserve the balance between security and freedom. In an anti authoritarian system, the police must possess the ability to enforce the law, but that power must always remain limited, lawful, and subject to review. For this reason, Article 105 also prohibits a parallel police, a partisan police force, and any armed internal body outside the lawful structure of the country.
In summary: Article 105 seeks to ensure that the police serves the security of the people and the enforcement of the law, and not political power. The anti authoritarian function of this Article lies in the fact that it places the police under the authority of the elected government, entrusts its budget to the House of Representatives, prohibits political interference and plainclothes forces, and subjects the use of force to the law and to judicial oversight.
Rationale of Article 106 – Intelligence Organizations
Article 106 is established to ensure that intelligence organizations serve the security of the country, and not political power. In many systems, the danger of authoritarianism does not arise only from the army or the police. At times, intelligence institutions, because of secrecy, access to information, and the possibility of hidden penetration, become the most dangerous instruments of domination. This Article exists so that the intelligence institution is, from the outset, defined as a lawful, accountable institution, subject to the elected government, and so that it cannot become a hidden state or an independent center of power. The emphasis that these institutions are created only by law and operate under the authority of the elected government and under the oversight of Parliament exists so that their existence and the limits of their powers remain clear, restricted, and subject to review. Likewise, the prohibition of interference in elections, political parties, the media, associations, unions, civil institutions, and political competition closes the way to the transformation of the intelligence organization into an instrument for the engineering of politics and the elimination of opponents. This Article also expressly provides that intelligence organizations have no right of arrest, interrogation outside the law, administering prisons or detention facilities, torture, or the creation of an independent armed force. The reason for this limitation is clear: if the intelligence institution simultaneously possesses the instruments of intelligence, arrest, interrogation, imprisonment, and armed force, it becomes an unrestrainable and repressive structure. For this reason, Article 106 deliberately separates these institutions from independent coercive instruments. The emphasis that wiretapping, surveillance, tracking, infiltration, and the covert collection of information about persons are permitted only by order of the competent court, for a lawful purpose, with respect to a specific case, and for a limited duration, exists so that security does not become a pretext for unregulated spying upon the people. The temporal limit of such authorization also exists to prevent permanent and endless surveillance. In an anti authoritarian system, information necessary for security may exist, but hidden and unlimited surveillance over the lives of the people is prohibited.
The prohibition of any economic activity, and likewise the ownership or administration of an economic enterprise, a media outlet, or a network of political and administrative influence, also exists so that the intelligence organization does not become a multilayered and impenetrable power. An institution that possesses intelligence, money, commerce, media, and a network of influence gradually moves beyond the control of law. Article 106 closes this path from the very beginning so that the intelligence institution remains only within the limits of its lawful mission.
In summary: Article 106 seeks to ensure that intelligence organizations exist for the defense of the security of the country, while at the same time preventing them from becoming a hidden state, an instrument of political repression, or a network of economic and security influence. The anti authoritarian function of this Article lies in the fact that it binds the intelligence institution to the law, the elected government, Parliament, and judicial oversight, and establishes a clear boundary between lawful security and hidden domination.
Rationale of Article 107 – Special Forces and the Prohibition of Parallel Forces
Article 107 is established so that the country may possess the necessary and effective force to confront grave threats, special operations, and exceptional situations, yet that such force shall never become an instrument of hidden power, political repression, or a parallel structure. In every anti authoritarian system, the existence of special forces may be necessary, but it is legitimate only when it acts by virtue of law, within the official structure of the Army or the National Police, and under the lawful command of the government. This Article exists so that no person, party, intelligence body, or center of power may build for itself an independent, secret, or ideological armed arm. The emphasis on the prohibition of the creation, equipping, training, financing, or use of any parallel force is intended to ensure that the country does not fall into armed duality, a hidden state, and rivalry among coercive institutions. If, alongside the lawful Army and Police, independent, partisan, or secret special forces are formed, the legal order of the country collapses and the way is opened to intimidation, coup, and the exercise of influence outside the law. For this reason, Article 107 expressly prohibits every independent combat unit or operational group outside the law.
The limitation of the use of special forces in internal affairs to exceptional cases, for a specific mission, for a limited duration, and with a clear lawful authorization, is intended to ensure that these forces do not become substitutes for the ordinary police or instruments of permanent intervention in society. Likewise, the express prohibition of the use of these forces for political intimidation, control of elections, repression of peaceful opposition, and suppression of peaceful assemblies draws a clear line between the preservation of security and the repression of freedoms. In an anti authoritarian system, a special force must exist for public security, and not for frightening the people and closing the civic sphere.
In summary: Article 107 is intended to ensure that the country has the special force necessary for security and exceptional operations, yet that such force remains within the framework of law, within the official structure of the Army or the National Police, and under the lawful command of the government. This Article both closes the way to the formation of parallel and secret forces, and prevents special forces from becoming instruments of political repression and the violation of the freedoms of the people.
Rationale of Article 108 – Prohibition of Secret Detention Facilities and Rules of Detention
Article 108 is established so that the deprivation of liberty of a human being, even in the event of detention or conviction, never means his removal from the protection of the law and from human dignity. In every anti authoritarian system, one of the most dangerous centers of concentrated power is the place where a person is deprived of liberty and at the same time removed from the sight of law and society. If prisons, detention facilities, places of confinement, and the execution of custodial sentences are turned into the hidden domain of coercive institutions, the way is opened to torture, forced confessions, and the elimination of opponents. For this reason, Article 108 provides that the administration of prisons, detention facilities, places of confinement, and the execution of custodial sentences shall be carried out only by a lawful civilian institution and under judicial oversight. The emphasis that no military, police, intelligence, security, or executive institution has the right to create, administer, or maintain any prison, detention facility, independent place of confinement, or interrogation center exists in order to prevent the simultaneous concentration of the powers of arrest, confinement, and interrogation. In an anti authoritarian system, the institution that makes the arrest must not itself possess the place of confinement and hidden interrogation, for such concentration is one of the principal conditions for the violation of human rights. The prohibition of every secret detention facility, every place outside official registration, outside judicial oversight, or lacking the lawful access of the detainee or prisoner to counsel and family exists so that no human being disappears within the structure of the state. Likewise, the provision that pretrial detention is permitted only by judicial order and for a limited duration, and that solitary confinement is permitted only in exceptional cases and by the reasoned order of a judicial authority, exists so that pretrial detention or solitary confinement does not become an instrument of pressure, exhaustion, and the psychological breaking of the human person. Article 108 also emphasizes that interrogation shall take place only in official, registered, and reviewable locations and must be accompanied by the complete recording of the interrogation process and the possibility of continuous oversight, so that torture, inhuman treatment, threats, coercion, and the extraction of unlawful confession are made impossible or reduced to the minimum possible extent. This rule exists so that interrogation is transformed from a hidden and unrestrained process into a lawful and controllable one. The express statement that the rights of prisoners and detainees, including official registration of their status, lawful notification, access to counsel, judicial review, medical care, and the prohibition of torture and degrading treatment, must in all circumstances be observed, rests upon the principle that a person does not cease to be human by being detained or imprisoned. Article 108 also, by providing for the prosecution and punishment of the instigators, perpetrators, and accomplices of torture and inhuman treatment, seeks to ensure that responsibility is not removed from the chain of command and execution.
Finally, the invalidation of every confession, report, or item of evidence obtained through secret detention, torture, coercion, or unlawful treatment exists so that the government and the judicial system derive no advantage from lawlessness. If the result of torture or coercion can be relied upon, then the prohibition of torture becomes meaningless in practice.
In summary: Article 108 is intended to remove prisons, detention facilities, and interrogation from the realm of hidden and arbitrary power and to transform them into a sphere that is lawful, registered, subject to oversight, and bound by human dignity. This Article both closes the path to secret detention facilities, torture, and forced confession, and guarantees that no detainee or prisoner is deprived of the protection of the law and of human dignity.
Rationale of Article 109 – State of Emergency
Article 109 is established so that the country may have the capacity for a rapid and effective response to war, armed insurrection, national disaster, or an immediate and widespread danger to the existence of the country, yet that such a response may never become a gateway to authoritarianism. In many countries, the state of emergency has been precisely the point from which the suspension of freedoms, the elimination of political competition, the concentration of power, and permanent extraordinary government have emerged. This Article exists so that the government in times of real danger may possess the authority necessary for immediate action, but that this authority from the outset remains bound by a definite duration, by the vote of Parliament, and by the non suspensible boundaries of the Constitution.
The emphasis that the declaration of a state of emergency is possible only upon the proposal of the government and only under specified and grave conditions exists so that this instrument does not become an ordinary method of rule. The express mention of war, armed insurrection, national disaster, and immediate and widespread danger closes the way to broad interpretation and political abuse. Likewise, the requirement that the declaration of a state of emergency must be reasoned, public, limited to its subject matter, and limited to a geographic area exists so that the government may not, under a general and vague title, place the whole country and all liberties at once under an extraordinary condition. The provision for an initial duration of no more than thirty days, and the rule that the continuation of the state of emergency is possible only by a vote of three fifths of the legal membership of Parliament and each time for no more than thirty days, exists to establish a balance between effectiveness and the restraint of power. In crisis, the government needs real time in which to act, but if extension of the emergency is easy and without restraint, that exceptional condition itself is covertly transformed into permanent government. For this reason, Article 109, in addition to time limited extensions, also prescribes an overall ceiling of six months, so that it remains clear that even crisis is not a warrant for unlimited rule. The addition of the rule that, if a state of emergency has once been declared within a twelve month period, the government may not declare a state of emergency again until two years after its conclusion except with the prior authorization of Parliament, is one of the most important anti authoritarian barriers of this Article. The great danger lies not only in the prolonged duration of one state of emergency. Another danger is that the government, by repeatedly switching the state of emergency off and on, may in practice keep the country in a permanent cycle of exception. This clause exists in order to close precisely that path, so that the government may not, at short and repeated intervals, revive that same exceptional authority again and again and make the normalization of emergency a method of rule. This Article also expressly provides that the government, in a state of emergency, may adopt and execute only those exceptional measures expressly provided by law, and only within the limits of necessity, for the removal of the danger, and in a temporary manner. The importance of this clause lies in the fact that the authority of the government in exceptional conditions is not unlimited and self created. The government may use only those instruments that have already been provided for in law and that are necessary for confronting that same defined danger. In this way, a state of emergency does not mean lawless government, but rather the limited and controlled exercise of exceptional powers within the framework of the law. While accepting the necessity of immediate action, Article 109 also declares the fundamental boundaries to be impassable. For this reason, even in a state of emergency, the sovereignty of the people, elections, the separation and balance of powers, judicial oversight, the prohibition of torture, the principle of legality of crime and punishment, fair trial, and the unchangeable principles of this Constitution are not subject to suspension. This part is the anti authoritarian heart of Article 109, because it makes clear that emergency may temporarily alter the manner of managing danger, but it may not destroy the foundation of the legitimacy of the system.
The emphasis that no officeholder or institution has the right to make the state of emergency a means of the suspension of Parliament, the elimination of political competition, general censorship, unregulated detention, unlimited military rule, or the permanent concentration of power exists in order to close those very paths through which authoritarianism has historically advanced. Likewise, by declaring null every act or decision outside the lawful limits of the state of emergency, and by providing for the legal responsibility of the relevant officeholders, Article 109 guarantees that the title of emergency may not become a shield of immunity for lawbreaking.
In summary: Article 109 is intended to ensure that the government, in the face of real danger, has the necessary instruments for the defense of the country and the management of crisis, yet that these instruments may never become a warrant for permanent emergency government, the suspension of freedoms, or the unrestrained concentration of power. By limiting the grounds, duration, scope, method of extension, and even the possibility of repetition of the state of emergency, and by preserving the non suspensible principles, this Article establishes a balance between the necessity of the authority of government in crisis and the necessity of the anti authoritarian restraint of power.
Rationale of Article 110 – Defense Treaties and the Presence of Allied Forces
Article 110 is established so that the country, in the real world, does not remain isolated and unsupported by relying solely upon its internal capacity. In the modern world, the preservation of national security, the strengthening of deterrent capability, and the confrontation of major threats, in many cases require defense and security treaties and agreements with friendly and allied states. This Article leaves open the way for such cooperation, but at the same time restrains it within the framework of independence, national sovereignty, and the oversight of lawful institutions.
The emphasis on the possibility of concluding defense and security treaties and agreements exists so that the government may, in pursuit of the national interest, establish strategic relations with the free world and with like minded states. A country deprived of every kind of defensive alliance remains alone in the face of external threats, and the cost of defending itself becomes far heavier. This Article accepts that enduring security is, at times, also secured through cooperation with allies. At the same time, Article 110 does not allow such cooperation to become a gateway to foreign influence or domination. For this reason, it makes the conclusion of every binding defense or security treaty or agreement conditional upon the approval of the Senate, and it permits the establishment of military bases or the stationing of military forces of friendly and allied states on the territory of Iran only with the approval of the Senate and the House of Representatives. This mechanism exists so that no government of the day may, by itself and without the consent of the national institutions, bind the security destiny of the country to hidden or hasty agreements. The requirement that the limits, duration, mission, number of forces, area of stationing, type of equipment, immunities, and financial and operational arrangements be expressly specified also exists to close the path to ambiguity and abuse. Foreign military presence, if ambiguous and without limit, may lead to enduring influence, hidden commitments, and the weakening of national sovereignty. By insisting that these matters be clear, limited, and subject to oversight, Article 110 separates defense cooperation from dependency or submission to domination. This Article also preserves the fundamental red lines of the country by expressly providing that no treaty, agreement, or foreign military presence may violate independence, territorial integrity, national sovereignty, the lawful command of the government, or lead to interference in the internal affairs of the country. The meaning of this clause is that a defensive alliance is permissible, but the surrender of the authority of the country is not. Security cooperation is possible, but foreign interference in domestic politics, national command, or the structure of governance is prohibited.
The prohibition of the use of the territory, airspace, waters, bases, or facilities of Iran outside the limits expressly provided in law and in the approved agreement, and likewise the requirement that the extension, expansion, or substantial alteration of any foreign military presence be subject to the same legal arrangements, exists in order to prevent the uncontrolled presence of foreign forces from becoming normalized. Article 110 seeks to ensure that, even in the case of defense cooperation, final authority remains in the hands of the lawful government and the national institutions.
In summary: Article 110 seeks to establish a balance between two necessities: on the one hand, the need of the country for national security, deterrence, and connection with friendly and allied states; and on the other hand, the necessity of preserving independence, national sovereignty, and the prohibition of every form of foreign influence or interference. The anti authoritarian function of this Article lies in the fact that it neither leaves the country isolated and unsupported, nor allows the government secretly or arbitrarily to place the territory and security of the country at the disposal of foreign powers.